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Public Lands and the Federal Government’s 
Compact-Based “Duty to Dispose”: A Case Study of 
Utah’s H.B. 148–The Transfer of Public Lands Act 
Donald J. Kochan* 
ABSTRACT 
Recent legislation passed in March 2012 in the State of Utah—the 
“Transfer of Public Lands Act and Related Study,” (“TPLA”) also commonly 
referred to as House Bill 148 (“H.B. 148”)—has demanded that the federal 
government, by December 31, 2014, “extinguish title” to certain public lands 
that the federal government currently holds (totaling an estimated more than 
20 million acres). It also calls for the transfer of such acreage to the State and 
establishes procedures for the development of a management regime for this 
increased state portfolio of land holdings resulting from the transfer. 
The State of Utah claims that the federal government made promises to it 
(at statehood when the federal government obtained the lands) that the federal 
ownership would be of limited duration and that the bulk of those lands would 
be timely disposed of by the federal government into private ownership or 
otherwise returned to the State. Longstanding precedents support the theory 
that Utah’s Enabling Act is a bilateral compact between the State and the 
federal government that should be treated like it is, and interpreted as, a 
binding contractual agreement. 
Utah’s TPLA presents fascinating issues for the areas of public lands, 
natural resources, federalism, contracts, and constitutional law. It represents a 
new chapter in the long book of wrangling between states in the West and the 
federal government over natural resources and public lands ownership, control, 
and management. The impact is potentially considerable—thirty-one percent of  
 
 
*Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1998; 
B.A., Western Michigan University, 1995. This article is adapted from an online “White Paper” 
titled “A Legal Overview of Utah’s H.B. 148 – The Transfer of Public Lands Act,” prepared for the 
Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy Studies, available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/detail/a-legal-overview-of-utahs-hb-148 [hereinafter Kochan White Paper]. 
I thank the Federalist Society for its support in this research project and for the permission to 
reprint in substantial part portions of that White Paper herein. I am grateful for the support and 
comments of Jennifer Spinella in the completion of this project. 
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our nation’s lands are owned by the federal government, and 63.9% of the 
lands in Utah are owned by the federal government. 
This Article provides an overview of the legal arguments on both sides of 
the TPLA debate. In the end, there is a credible case that rules of construction 
favor an interpretation of the Utah Enabling Act that includes some form of a 
duty to dispose on the part of the federal government. At a minimum, the legal 
arguments in favor of the TPLA are serious and, if taken seriously, the TPLA 
presents an opportunity for further clarification of public lands law and the 
relationship between the states and the federal government regarding those 
lands. Moreover, other states are exploring similar avenues to assert their 
claims vis-à-vis the federal government and are in various stages of developing 
land transfer strategies that will model or learn from the TPLA. That fact 
further underscores the need for a renewed serious and informed legal 
discussion on the issues related to disposal obligations of the federal 
government. This Article takes a first step into that discussion. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Now a promise made is a debt unpaid.”1 Just as the poet Robert 
Service penned it, the western states might wish to adopt this adage 
in an emerging area of contention with the federal government over 
proper ownership of public lands. Some states are waiting for the 
federal government to honor its promise to dispose of certain lands 
and thereby relieve itself of a debt it has owed to these states since 
their entry into the Union. 
Who does or should own public lands in the Western United 
States has long been the source of contention, controversy, and 
sometimes confusion. While many believe that some of the primary 
legal battles have long been settled, this Article looks anew at some 
relatively under-analyzed theories on the federal government’s 
obligations to dispose of certain property holdings it has in the 
Western United States. By examining state enabling acts and 
promises made at statehood in Utah and other states, this Article 
 
 1. ROBERT W. SERVICE, The Cremation of Sam McGee, in THE SPELL OF THE YUKON AND 
OTHER POEMS 64, 64 (Dover Publications 2012) (1916). In Service’s poem set in the Yukon, a 
friend makes a promise to Sam McGee to cremate his remains so that he might live on in the 
afterlife warm. Although difficult and costly to the friend in terms of time and effort, this friend 
goes to great pains to fulfill his promise and discusses in the poem the honor involved in 
fulfilling the promise, while speaking of the fact that “the trail has its own stern code”—an 
obliging custom—which requires fidelity and diligence to fulfilling one’s promise once made. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014 11:06 AM 
1133 Case Study of Utah’s H.B. 148 
 1135 
posits that the government may have a duty to dispose of certain 
public lands under a theory of a contractual obligation created by 
these compacts of statehood. 
Recent legislation passed in the State of Utah has demanded that 
the federal government extinguish title to certain public lands that 
the federal government currently holds.2 Sponsors of the legislation 
claim that the federal government made promises to the State of 
Utah (at statehood when the federal government obtained the lands) 
that the federal ownership would be of limited duration and that the 
bulk of those lands would be timely disposed of by the federal 
government into private ownership or otherwise returned to the 
State.3 This Article provides a legal overview of these claims. 
On March 23, 2012, Governor Gary Herbert of the State of Utah 
signed into Utah law the “Transfer of Public Lands Act and Related 
Study” (“TPLA”),4 also commonly referred to House Bill 148 (“H.B. 
148”).5 This legislation demands that the federal government 
“extinguish” its title to an estimated more than 20 million6 (or by 
some reports even more than 30 million7) acres of federal public 
lands in the State of Utah by December 31, 2014.8 It also calls for 
the transfer of such acreage to the State and establishes procedures 
for the development of a management regime for this increased state 
portfolio of land holdings resulting from the transfer.9 
Advocates for the TPLA claim that the current federal retention 
of these public lands deprives the state of revenue that would come 
from, inter alia, (1) the State’s receipt of a guaranteed percentage of 
the proceeds from disposal sales it has expected the federal 
 
 2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-6-101 et seq. (West 2012). 
 3. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Utah Asks U.S. to Return 20 Million Acres of Land, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2012, at A9 (discussing rationale and history articulated by bill sponsors). 
 4. Id.; Mori Kessler, Gov. Herbert Signs Public Lands Transfer Act, ST. GEORGE NEWS (Mar. 
23, 2012), http://www.stgeorgeutah.com/news/archive/2012/03/23/gov-herbert-signs-public-
lands-transfer-act/. 
 5. All H.B. 148 “Bill Documents” are available at http://le.utah.gov/~2012/htmdoc/ 
hbillhtm/hb0148.htm. H.B. 148 as Enrolled is available at http://le.utah.gov/~2012/ 
bills/hbillenr/hb0148.pdf. 
 6. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 3; see also U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND 
MGMT., PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 2011, at 24 (2012), available at http://www.blm.gov/ 
public_land_statistics/pls11/pls2011.pdf (Table 1-4). 
 7. See, e.g., Local Republicans Back Fight for Control of Federal Lands, SPECTRUM (St. George, 
Utah), May 4, 2012, at A1. 
 8. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-6-102, 103 (West 2012). 
 9. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-6-101 et seq. 
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government to conduct; and (2) the State’s ability to tax property 
after it is disposed into private hands, whereas while the federal 
government retains those lands they are exempt from taxation.10 
Moreover, the State has a variety of other arguments it offers for 
transferring ownership into State hands, including claims that the 
federal government is a poor manager of the lands and that it has an 
unwise concept of multiple use, among other things.11 This Article 
makes no attempt to resolve whether H.B. 148 is good policy in 
these areas or even whether it will result in an increase in revenue. 
Instead, it is concerned with conducting an overview of the legal 
arguments surrounding the legislation and its validity. 
Whether the State has the authority to demand that the federal 
government extinguish rights depends, in large part, on the proper 
interpretation of the Property Clause in the Constitution. Article IV, 
Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides that: “The Congress shall 
have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United 
States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to 
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular 
state.”12 This Article will consider some of the implications of 
different theories of the Property Clause on the determination of the 
TPLA’s validity. 
H.B. 148, whose chief sponsor was Utah Representative Ken 
Ivory,13 represents a new chapter in the long book of wrangling 
between states in the west and the federal government over natural 
resources and public lands ownership, control, and management.14 
 
 10. See CONSTITUTIONAL DEF. COUNCIL, TOWARD A BALANCED PUBLIC LANDS POLICY: A 
CASE STATEMENT FOR THE H.B. 148: UTAH’S TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS ACT 4 (2012) [hereinafter 
CDC Nov. 2012 Case Statement], available at http://utah.gov/ltgovernor/docs/CDC-
AGLandsTransferHB148SummaryInteractive.pdf. 
 11. See Kathleen Clarke, Finding a Balanced Public Lands Policy, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake 
City), Nov. 14, 2012, at A12 (“Utah’s public lands would be better managed, more productive 
and more accessible under state stewardship. Current federal land policy and management is 
inefficient, ineffective and threatens the long-term use and enjoyment of the public lands.”). 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 13. A copy of the bill as introduced, which includes appended to it a Legislative Review 
Note critical of the bill authored by Utah’s Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, is 
available at http://le.utah.gov/~2012/bills/hbillint/hb0148.pdf. 
 14. As one report explained: 
“Private land ownership has been the cornerstone for freedom in this country and 
economic opportunity. It’s one of the blessings we’ve had as a country when we came 
here and had for the first time in a universal way the ability to own our own land,” 
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Thirty-one percent of our nation’s lands are owned by the federal 
government, and 63.9% of the lands in Utah are owned by the 
federal government.15 Of these federal holdings, “[t]he BLM 
manages nearly 22.9 million acres of public lands in Utah, 
representing about 42 percent of the state,” according to the U.S. 
Department of Interior (“DOI”) Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”) Utah State Office website.16 
Utah’s H.B. 148 is a controversial, bold demand made against 
the federal government and has expectedly raised eyebrows in the 
political and legal discourse.17 This Article is designed to describe 
the TPLA and to provide a summary of some of the legal questions 
related to the enforceability of the State of Utah’s demands. While 
the politics of the demand, the prudence of reallocating ownership, 
and the practicalities of public lands reforms implicated by H.B. 148 
are certainly topics worth analyzing and pursuing, this Article will 
not engage in those fields of discussion. 
As Governor Herbert has noted, the legal case for H.B. 148 may 
not be a “slam dunk,”18 but there are legitimate arguments to 
support the law, and certainly critics of the law overstate their legal 
case against the Act.19 At the very least, there are open legal 
questions involved in the TPLA that have never received definitive 
resolution in the courts.20 As such, critics cannot make a cut and dry 
 
[Governor] Herbert said prior to signing the legislation. “And loss of that ownership 
in fact takes away freedom and liberty to the public and the people. Federal control of 
our public lands has put us at a distinct disadvantage compared to other states.” 
Charles Geraci, Governor Signs Bill That Challenges Feds Over Land Control, HERALD JOURNAL 
(Logan, Utah), (Mar. 23, 2012), http://news.hjnews.com/news/article_50a20c9e-7555-11e1-
b1ad-001871e3ce6c.html. 
 15. JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW & POLICY 141 (2d ed. 2009). 
 16. Utah, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://www.blm.gov/ut/st/en.html. 
 17. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 3 (reporting reactions to the TPLA). 
 18. Utah Law Demands Release of Federal Land, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 24, 2012, at A11 
(quoting Governor Herbert as saying “‘It’s not a slam dunk, but there is legal reasoning and a 
rational thought process.’”). 
 19. Despite the claims by some that there is universal agreement that the TPLA is 
unconstitutional, with greater education and further debate, there is a growing awareness that 
such claims overstate the case against the TPLA and similar legislation. See, e.g., Jim Kalvelage, 
Takeover of Fed Lands Could Be Costly, Profitable, RUIDOSO NEWS (Ruidoso, N.M.), Feb. 26, 2013 
(stating that while the “New Mexico Office of the Courts contended the measure would face 
constitutional challenges from the feds,” nonetheless “[t]he office noted that some legal experts 
however feel that the demand and the legislation supporting the effort may be constitutional”). 
 20. Utah’s Constitutional Defense Council makes this point, stating, “The question of 
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case against the law. In fact, if anything, opposition statements made 
so far regarding the law may reflect an over-confidence in its 
unconstitutionality and an overstatement of the strength of 
precedent. To prevail, Utah’s legal case will need to, in part, 
distinguish some past court decisions. And, in some situations 
where precedent might seem to weigh against validity of the TPLA 
demand, Utah may need to make a case for revisiting such 
interpretations if necessary. 
The TPLA has, to date, received a strikingly low level of press 
coverage and public attention (even inside Utah). Perhaps part of the 
reason for a low level of news coverage or serious analysis of the 
TPLA is that people have not taken it seriously. For example, in 
April 2012, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Interior is 
quoted as saying that Utah’s law is “nothing more than a political 
stunt.”21 Despite this perception that some hold, the research 
leading to this Article supports a finding that there are indeed 
serious legal questions to consider with the TPLA. The legal case for 
it should not be quickly dismissed.22 
Part II of this Article provides the basic statutory text and 
background of Utah’s TPLA. Part III very briefly explores some of the 
 
whether the Property or Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution permit this 
unilateral reversal in federal land policy or repudiation of the terms of the State’s enabling act is 
not resolved, because no federal appellate court has directly addressed this issue.” CDC Nov. 
2012 Case Statement, supra note 10. 
For those advocates who wish to advance that there is more than a policy dispute at issue 
but also a substantive legal claim that must be taken seriously, the next statement by the CDC is 
troubling, where they state: “However, the larger and more significant question is whether the shift 
from disposal to permanent federal retention of a large portion of public lands in the Western 
States is good public policy today.” Id. (emphasis added). Such public policy concerns are beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 21. Matt Canham, Salazar: Utah Just Playing Politics in Land Fight, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB. 
(Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/53980576-90/salazar-utah-lands-
energy.html.csp (claiming “Salazar sees it all as nothing but show,” and quoting Salazar as 
saying the Act is only “political rhetoric you see in an election year”). 
 22. A recent student note underscored the seriousness of the matter. See Note, No 
Laughing Matter: Utah’s Fight to Reclaim Federal Lands, MICH. J. ENVT’L & ADMIN. L. ONLINE (Feb. 
26, 2013), http://students.law.umich.edu/mjeal/2013/02/no-laughing-matter-
utah%E2%80%99s-fight-to-reclaim-federal-lands/. Discussing the Kochan White Paper and 
related law, that author concluded that critics of the TPLA have too quickly dismissed the 
constitutional validity of the TPLA. Id. The author noted that “broad precedential statements 
cited by critics of TPLA are much broader than the holdings themselves require, and none of the 
precedent addresses the specific question of whether the federal government is obligated in 
contract to extinguish title to land received from the state in consideration for admission to the 
Union.” Id. 
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historical antecedents to the TPLA. However, given that the history 
of land disputes between the federal and state governments is long 
and detailed in Utah as it is in all of the West, this Part aims only to 
introduce just enough of the climate surrounding the TPLA and its 
related land dispute to get a sense of the atmosphere rather than 
attempting to provide a comprehensive survey of the decades of 
disputes. 
The heart of this Article’s analysis lies in Part IV, which provides 
a legal analysis of the TPLA. The principal section presents the case 
for a defense of the TPLA based on a compact-based duty on the 
federal government to dispose of public lands, pursuant to promises 
made in Utah’s Enabling Act. The second subsection looks at some 
of the cases proffered as disabling to the legal validity of the TPLA. 
That subsection posits that most of the case law directed at 
invalidating the TPLA is inapposite and most of the court statements 
bandied about against the TPLA are mere dicta having no 
precedential effect. For the most part, courts should be operating on 
a clean slate when analyzing the validity of the TPLA. 
The next section of Part IV introduces, only briefly, additional 
arguments to support the TPLA based in Federalism, Equal Footing, 
and other constitutional concerns. The final section of legal analysis 
flags for future attention the hurdles of justiciability that may 
interfere with Utah seeking a court determination of its rights under 
the TPLA. The Article concludes contending that there are serious 
arguments favoring the validity and constitutionality of the TPLA. 
Since 2012 and particularly after the passage of H.B. 148, a 
number of Western states—including Arizona,23 Colorado,24 
 
 23. In March and April 2012, the Arizona House and Senate respectively passed 
legislation (S.B. 1332) very similar to Utah’s H.B. 148, but it was vetoed by the Governor on 
May 14, 2012. See S.B. 1332, 15th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/DocumentsForBill.asp?Session_ID=107&Bill_Number=SB1332. Some 
movement has again occurred in 2013 to revive efforts in Arizona. Jim Seckler, Board Wants 
Federal Land Transferred to State, MOHAVE VALLEY DAILY NEWS (Bullhead City, Ariz.), June 17, 
2013 (reporting on county board discussions regarding resolutions supporting transfers of 
federal public lands to the state in Arizona). 
 24. A bill was introduced in Colorado, S.B. 13-142, that would “require[] the United 
States to cede or extinguish title to all agricultural public lands and transfer title to the state.” 
S.B. 13-142, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013), available at 
http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2013a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont/3BC575329E0E94BB87257A8E00
73C714?Open&file=142_01.pdf (bill text). That bill died in committee. See Bill Summary for 
S.B. 13-142, 69th Gen Assemb., 1st Reg Sess. (Colo. 2013), available at 
http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2013a/commsumm.nsf/b4a3962433b52fa787256e5f00670
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Idaho,25 Montana,26 Nevada,27 New Mexico,28 and Wyoming29—
 
a71/bf63b03814032aa587257b0f0072a00e?OpenDocument (bill history and status). 
 25. In Idaho, H.C.R. 21—a concurrent resolution—after passing the House in March 2013 
was finalized with passage in the Senate in April 2013 “[s]tating findings of the Legislature and 
authorizing the Legislative Council to appoint a study committee to ascertain the process for the 
State of Idaho to acquire title to and control of public lands controlled by the federal government 
in the State of Idaho.” H.C.R. 21, 62d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013), available at 
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2013/HCR021.htm. A companion concurrent 
resolution—H.C.R. 22—also passed the Idaho House in March and the Idaho Senate in April 
that stated, inter alia, “the Legislature of the State of Idaho demands that the federal government 
imminently transfer title to all of the public lands within Idaho’s borders directly to the State of 
Idaho,” and “the Legislature of the State of Idaho urges the United States Congress in the most 
strenuous terms to engage in good faith communication, cooperation, coordination and 
consultation with the State of Idaho regarding the transfer of public lands directly to the State of 
Idaho.” H.C.R. 22, 62d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013), available at 
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2013/HCR022.htm. Furthermore, the resolution 
states that “the Legislature calls for the creation of an Interim Public Lands Study Committee” 
to examine the issues related to the management and transfer of such lands. Id. That committee 
began work in the summer of 2013, and this Author testified before it on August 9, 2013 by 
invitation of the committee. See State of Idaho Legislature Federal Lands Interim Committee 
Meeting, Aug. 9, 2013, available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/ 
2013/interim/lands0809.pdf. For news reporting and analysis on Idaho’s recent legislative 
efforts, see Rocky Barker, Idaho Lawmakers Examine Federal Lands Transfer, IDAHO STATESMAN 
(Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.idahostatesman.com/2013/08/10/2698487/lawmakers-examine-
federal-lands.html (briefly discussing August 9 meeting of the Federal Lands Interim 
Committee); William L. Spence, Do States Have a “Duty to Dispose” of Public Lands?, LEWISTON 
MORNING TRIB. (Lewiston, Idaho) (Mar. 3, 2013), 
http://lmtribune.com/northwest/article_e1dd3f69-3ad6-5597-8912-
6fd7f3c808ab.html?mode=jqm (providing a background of the TPLA debate and Idaho’s 
consideration of similar legislation, including discussing the legal arguments advanced in the 
Kochan White Paper and policy arguments against the effort); see also William L. Spence, Land 
Transfer Bill Unlikely This Year, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. (Lewiston, Idaho) (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://lmtribune.com/northwest/article_bb479f27-afba-5c34-8b4f-1acda29c5f4b.html 
(discussing Idaho draft bill similar to Utah’s TPLA and explaining it is unlikely to be introduced 
until after an interim study committee reviews the matter and drafts a bill); Dan Popkey, Bedke 
Backs Idaho Management of Federal Lands, IDAHO STATESMAN (Boise) (Jan. 12, 2013), 
http://www.idahostatesman.com/2013/01/12/2409500/bedke-backs-idaho-management-
of.html (discussing initial efforts by Governor and legislators in Idaho to consider legislation 
modeled after Utah’s TPLA). 
 26. In Montana, Joint Resolution 15 passed in April 2013 calling for a study of the issue 
of managing public lands within which it the state may arguably evaluate the issue of 
transferring federal public lands to state ownership. S.J. 15, 63rd Leg. (Mont. 2013), available at 
http://laws.leg.mt.gov/legprd/LAW0210W$BSIV.ActionQuery?P_BILL_NO1=15&P_BLTP_BIL
L_TYP_CD=SJ&Z_ACTION=Find&P_SESS=20131 (“A joint resolution of the senate and the 
house of representatives of the state of Montana requesting an interim study evaluating the 
management of certain federal lands, assessing risks, and identifying solutions.”). 
 27. On June 1, 2013, the Governor of Nevada signed into law A.B. 227 which creates “the 
Nevada Land Management Task Force to conduct a study addressing the transfer of certain 
public lands in this State.” A.B. 227, 77th Leg. (Nev. 2013), available at 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Reports/history.cfm?billname=AB227 (bill text 
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have started the process of considering legislation similar to or 
modeled after the TPLA—whether by drafting bills, passing 
resolutions, introducing bills, or committing to study the issue 
through special committees or task forces. In 2013, one state 
without substantial federal land holdings, South Carolina, even 
passed a resolution expressing solidarity with these Western 
states.30 None of these states has yet passed legislation with as 
strong a demand as in Utah’s TPLA, but the possibility of such 
additional state legislation remains. Because many of these states 
have enabling acts with legislation similar to Utah as well as 
substantial federal landholdings within each state, much of the 
analysis in this Article may prove useful for analyzing the legal 
 
and history). 
 28. In New Mexico, H.B. 292, a bill very similar to Utah’s H.B. 148, was introduced in the 
state House in January 2013 but it did not pass into law. See H.B. 292, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 
2013), available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/13%20Regular/bills/house/HB0292.pdf. 
For news commentary on New Mexico’s 2013 legislative efforts, see Paul Gessing, Time For 
Control of Most Federal Lands, LOS ALAMOS MONITOR (Los Alamos, N.M.), June 13, 2013 
(discussing New Mexico’s House Bill 292, indicating that “[a]lthough it failed to pass, it began 
the discussion about who is best able to manage New Mexico’s public lands”); see also Stella 
Davis, Bill Would Move New Mexico’s Federal Lands Into State Custody, CARLSBAD CURRENT-ARGUS 
(Carlsbad, N.M.) (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.currentargus.com/ci_22539422/bill-would-move-
new-mexicos-federal-lands-into (describing arguments by proponents of legislation for the 
transfer of public lands in New Mexico that such transfer is necessary due to the disparate 
treatment regarding federal land holdings between New Mexico and Texas and generally 
between the current Western states and other states east of the Mississippi); Jim Kalvelage, NM 
Legislation to Take Federal Lands, RUIDOSO NEWS (Ruidoso, N.M.), Jan. 31, 2013 (discussing 
transfer of public lands and related task force bill introduced in New Mexico legislature in 2013 
sponsored by Representative Yvette Herrell and Senator Richard C. Martinez); Village Backs 
Federal Land Transfer Legislation, RUIDOSO NEWS (Ruidoso, N.M.) (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://www.ruidosonews.com/ci_22492604/village-backs-federal-land-transfer-legislation 
(discussing resolution passed by Ruidoso village councilors “supporting legislation to create a 
mechanism for the transfer of public land from the federal government to the state”). 
 29. On March 14, 2013, the Governor of Wyoming signed into law H.B. 228, which 
creates a task force on the transfer of public lands. See H.B. 228, 62d Leg. (Wyo. 2013), available 
at http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2013/Bills/HB0228.pdf (text of the bill). It states in part that it is 
“[a]n Act relating to public lands; creating the task force on the transfer of federal lands; 
requiring a report from the attorney general on possible legal recourses available to compel the 
federal government to relinquish ownership and management of specified federal lands in 
Wyoming; requiring a study and report by the task force.” Id.; see also H.B. 228 Transfer of 
Federal Lands-Study, 62nd Sess. (Wyo. 2013), available at 
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2013/Digest/HB0228.htm (bill history and status). 
 30. On February 27, 2013, the South Carolina House of Representatives passed a 
resolution with a statement of supporting the transfer of federal lands to the Western states. See 
H. 3552, 120th Sess. (S.C. 2013), available at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess120_2013-
2014/bills/3552.htm. 
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situation in each of those states. Any effort at adaptation and 
application of this Article’s analysis to those state situations would 
require some additional research that is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Nonetheless, much of the legal analysis will be relevant to, 
and should inform, the legal discussions of transfer of public land act 
legislation in each of those other states. 
The fact that other states are exploring similar avenues to assert 
their claims vis-à-vis the federal government and are in various 
stages of developing land transfer strategies that will model or learn 
from H.B. 14831 further underscores the need for a serious and 
informed legal discussion on the issues related to disposal 
obligations of the federal government. This Article takes a first step 
into that discussion. 
II. BACKGROUND ON UTAH’S TRANSFER OF PUBLIC  
LANDS ACT—H.B. 148 
The legislation originally known and proposed as H.B. 148, and 
as enacted known as the Transfer of Public Lands Act and Related 
Study, has three basic parts codified in Utah Code sections 63L-6-
101 through 104.32 These three main parts can be loosely described 
as the following: (1) the scope part explaining the breadth of the 
TPLA by defining terms and identifying exceptions;33 (2) the demand 
part;34 and (3) the pre- and post-extinguishment planning and 
management part, which describes the entities that will govern and 
prepare for a transition of ownership into State hands.35 
The “definitions” set out in Utah Code section 63L-6-101, the 
most significant part of the first portion of the Act, establish the 
TPLA’s scope by defining what is not included in the demand. It 
states that “‘Public lands’ means lands within the exterior 
boundaries of [Utah] except,” to one degree or another: private lands, 
Indian lands, lands held in trust for the state, lands reserved for state 
 
 31. Dianne Stallings, County Pushes for Interstate Forest Management Plan, RUIDOSO NEWS 
(Ruidoso, N.M.) (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.ruidosonews.com/ci_21311888/county-pushes-
interstate-forest-management-plan (“Bills patterned after Utah’s [H.B. 148] are being prepared 
for filing next year in Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and New Mexico, according to reports.”); 
Johnson, supra note 3. 
 32. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-6-101 et seq. (West 2012). 
 33. Id. § 63L-6-102. 
 34. Id. § 63L-6-103. 
 35. Id.; H.B. 148, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012). 
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institutions, a few other lands with distinct ownership 
characteristics, and finally, and most significantly, certain identified 
federally controlled areas of the State including the National Parks, 
National Monuments, Wilderness, and several other special-
designation federal holdings.36 Thus, especially as a result of this 
 
 36. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-6-102 (emphasis added). The TPLA provides: 
§ 63L-6-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) “Governmental entity” is as defined in Section 59-2-511. 
(2) “Net proceeds” means the proceeds from the sale of public lands, after subtracting 
expenses incident to the sale of the public lands. 
(3) “Public lands” means lands within the exterior boundaries of this state except: 
(a) lands to which title is held by a person who is not a governmental entity; 
(b) lands owned or held in trust by this state, a political subdivision of this 
state, or an independent entity; 
(c) lands reserved for use by the state system of public education as described 
in Utah Constitution Article X, Section 2, or a state institution of higher 
education listed in Section 53B-1-102; 
(d) school and institutional trust lands as defined in Section 53C-1-103; 
(e) lands within the exterior boundaries as of January 1, 2012, of the 
following that are designated as national parks: 
(i) Arches National Park; (ii) Bryce Canyon National Park; (iii) 
Canyonlands National Park; (iv) Capitol Reef National Park; and (v) 
Zion National Park; 
(f) lands within the exterior boundaries as of January 1, 2012, of the 
following national monuments managed by the National Park Service as of 
January 1, 2012: 
(i) Cedar Breaks National Monument; (ii) Dinosaur National 
Monument; (iii) Hovenweep National Monument; (iv) Natural Bridges 
National Monument; (v) Rainbow Bridge National Monument; and (vi) 
Timpanogos Cave National Monument; 
(g) lands within the exterior boundaries as of January 1, 2012, of the Golden 
Spike National Historic Site; 
(h) lands within the exterior boundaries as of January 1, 2012, of the 
following wilderness areas located in the state that, as of January 1, 2012, are 
designated as part of the National Wilderness Preservation System under the 
Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.: 
(i) Ashdown Gorge Wilderness; (ii) Beartrap Canyon Wilderness; (iii) 
Beaver Dam Mountains Wilderness; (iv) Black Ridge Canyons 
Wilderness; (v) Blackridge Wilderness; (vi) Box-Death Hollow 
Wilderness; (vii) Canaan Mountain Wilderness; (viii) Cedar Mountain 
Wilderness; (ix) Cottonwood Canyon Wilderness; (x) Cottonwood 
Forest Wilderness; (xi) Cougar Canyon Wilderness; (xii) Dark Canyon 
Wilderness; (xiii) Deep Creek Wilderness; (xiv) Deep Creek North 
Wilderness; (xv) Deseret Peak Wilderness; (xvi) Doc’s Pass Wilderness; 
(xvii) Goose Creek Wilderness; (xviii) High Uintas Wilderness; (xix) 
LaVerkin Creek Wilderness; (xx) Lone Peak Wilderness; (xxi) Mount 
Naomi Wilderness; (xxii) Mount Nebo Wilderness; (xxiii) Mount 
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last exception, most of the federal lands within the State of Utah that 
have received a heightened status of protection (beyond the more 
general category of “public lands” that are typically open to multiple 
use, for example) are not subjects of the TPLA. 
The heart of the TPLA is in the “demand” part. Utah Code 
section 63L-6-103(1) states: “On or before December 31, 2014, the United 
States shall: (a) extinguish title to public lands; and (b) transfer title to public 
lands to the state.”37 
Within the last substantive parts dealing with planning and 
managing the transfer of lands, the first major provision in Utah 
Code section 63L-6-103(2) requires that:  
If the state transfers title to any public lands with respect to which 
the state receives title under Subsection (1)(b), the state shall: (a) 
retain 5% of the net proceeds the state receives from the transfer of 
title; and (b) pay 95% of the net proceeds the state receives from 
the transfer of title to the United States.38  
Thus, if after the State gets the lands back it decides to sell that 
property to private owners, the division of the proceeds will replicate 
the same division and school trust commitment that would exist 
according to the terms of the Utah Enabling Act39 had (and as if) the 
United States sold the property itself. 
The final portion of the Act dealing with management is in the 
uncodified section 5 of H.B. 148, which calls for the creation of a 
Utah Constitutional Defense Council (“CDC”) study to evaluate 
 
Olympus Wilderness; (xxiv) Mount Timpanogos Wilderness; (xxv) Paria 
Canyon-Vermilion Cliffs Wilderness; (xxvi) Pine Valley Mountain 
Wilderness; (xxvii) Red Butte Wilderness; (xxviii) Red Mountain 
Wilderness; (xxix) Slaughter Creek Wilderness; (xxx) Taylor Creek 
Wilderness; (xxxi) Twin Peaks Wilderness; (xxxii) Wellsville Mountain 
Wilderness; and (xxxiii) Zion Wilderness; 
(i) lands with respect to which the jurisdiction is ceded to the United States 
as provided in Section 63L-1-201 or 63L-1-203; 
(j) real property or tangible personal property owned by the United States if 
the property is within the boundaries of a municipality; or 
(k) lands, including water rights, belonging to an Indian or Indian tribe, band, 
or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a 
restriction against alienation imposed by the United States. 
Id. 
 37. Id. § 63L-6-103(1) (emphasis added). 
 38. Id. § 63L-6-103(2). 
 39. UTAH ENABLING ACT (1894), available at http://archives.utah.gov/research/ 
exhibits/Statehood/1894text.htm. 
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implementation strategies and develop legislation to plan for the 
State management of its soon to be acquired lands.40 As part of this 
requirement, the CDC published both a “case statement”41 and a 
separate “report”42 in November 2012. 
In 2013, the Utah legislature continued to express its 
commitment to the TPLA. Passed by the Utah House and Senate in 
March 2013, Utah’s Senate Joint Resolution 13 “strongly urges the 
federal government to transfer title to the public lands within the 
boundaries of the State of Utah to the State, and strongly urges the 
governor and Utah’s congressional delegation to work to obtain from 
the federal government the transfer of these lands to this state.”43 
Moreover, signed April 1, 2013, Utah’s H.B. 142 “requires the Public 
Lands Policy Coordinating Office to conduct a study and economic 
analysis of the transfer of certain federal lands to state ownership.”44 
Several political subdivisions within Utah also continue to consider 
resolutions supporting the TPLA, and several have passed such 
statements of approval and support.45 
The remaining parts of this Article will analyze the legal 
arguments regarding the demand portion of the legislation. Whether 
and to what extent the State of Utah may demand that the federal 
government extinguish title to certain of its public lands holdings in 
the State of Utah will depend on whether the federal government 
owes the State a “duty to dispose.” 
III. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO UTAH’S TPLA/H.B. 148 
The long history of conflict over control of lands in the Western 
states and disputes over the proper level of federal control dates back 
 
 40. Utah H.B. 148 § 5. These management and implementation portions of the Act, 
including the division and commitment of proceeds and the CDC report and proposed 
legislation, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 41. See CDC Nov. 2012 Case Statement, supra note 10. 
 42. CONSTITUTIONAL DEF. COUNCIL, REPORT ON UTAH’S TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS ACT: 
H.B. 148, (2012) [hereinafter CDC NOV. 2012 REPORT], available at 
http://utah.gov/ltgovernor/docs/CDC-AGLandsTransferHB148.pdf. 
 43. See S.J. Res. 13, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2013). 
 44. See H.B. 142, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2013). 
 45. See, e.g., County and City Support Land Transfer, SPECTRUM (St. George, Utah), Mar. 6, 
2013, at A4 (discussing Iron County Commission and Cedar City Council approval of 
resolutions supporting the TPLA); Council Approves HB 148 Resolution, SPECTRUM (St. George, 
Utah), Jan. 17, 2013, at A1 (discussing Enoch City Council unanimous approval of a resolution 
supporting the TPLA). 
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to the very formation of the new states across the decades after the 
Revolutionary War.46 In some ways, the TPLA/H.B. 148 is yet 
another—although arguably distinguishable—chapter in federal-state 
tensions and battle for control of the public lands.47 A few examples 
of the historical antecedents to the TPLA are provided below as a 
sampling of the efforts in Utah and other states that have attempted 
to wrest ownership, control, and management of lands away from 
the federal government across the years. 
Consider, for example, a 1915 “memorialization” resolution from 
the Utah Senate to the President, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. 
House of Representatives exclaiming Utah’s understanding that the 
federal government had made a promise to dispose of the public 
lands it acquired when Utah became a state.48 That statement, titled 
Senate Joint Memorial Number Four reads, in part: 
In harmony with the spirit and letter of the land grants to the 
national government, in perpetuation of a policy that has done more 
to promote the general welfare than any other policy in our 
national life and in conformity with the terms of our Enabling 
Act, we, the members of the Legislature of the State of Utah, 
memorialize the President and the Congress of the United 
States for the speedy return to the former liberal National 
attitude toward the public domain, and we call attention to the 
fact that the burden of State and local government in Utah is borne 
by the taxation of less than one-third the lands of the State, which 
alone is vested in private or corporate ownership, and we hereby 
earnestly urge a policy that will afford an opportunity to settle 
our lands and make use of our resources on terms of equality 
with the older states, to the benefit and upbuilding [sic] of the 
State and to the strength of the nation.49 
Several similar resolutions have issued across the years from 
other states with arguments based on their compacts and 
agreements with the federal government where the states believed 
the federal government has a fiduciary or contractual duty to dispose 
 
 46. See generally PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (photo. 
reprint 1979) (1968). 
 47. This Article makes no attempt to provide a survey of these disputes and instead only 
acknowledges the existence of longstanding and enduring conflicts. 
 48. S.J. Mem’l 4 (Utah 1915), as reprinted in CDC NOV. 2012 REPORT, supra note 42, at 17. 
 49. Id. 
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of its land ownership.50 As the Utah CDC Report from November 
2012 explains, many other efforts stand in the same company as the 
1915 resolution: 
When the federal government began to move more toward policies 
of reservation and conservation in the early 1900’s, Utah registered 
its objections by urging the return to active disposal. At various 
points throughout the 20th century, Utah restated these objections, 
particularly upon the passage of [the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976], wherein the policy shift to one of land 
retention and preservation became express federal law. For various 
reasons, mostly political, these prior Utah efforts to restore the 
benefits contemplated by the Enabling Act have been 
unsuccessful.51 
In their claims, many states asserted that the original and 
longstanding policies of the United States were dedicated to the 
disposition (not retention) of federal lands,52 and these states have 
been concerned when paradigmatic shifts toward retention (and 
against disposal) seemed to begin. 
Across the twentieth century, there were increasing legislative 
and regulatory movements toward federal retention of public lands, 
in many ways critically culminating in the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”), which ultimately provided 
that “Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States that 
the public lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless . . . it is 
determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national 
interest.”53 As Rasband notes regarding the gradual shift in public 
lands policy, “The move toward reservation of public lands . . . was 
a substantial change in public lands policy. Nevertheless, these 
reservations can still be understood as exceptions to the still- 
 
 
 50. See, e.g., Granting Remaining Unreserved Public Lands to States: Hearings Before the Senate 
Committee of Public Lands and Surveys, 72d Cong. (1932) (lengthy hearings that documented past 
state demands and included debate over a policy of returning land to states). 
 51. CDC NOV. 2012 REPORT, supra note 42, at 6. 
 52. Louis Touton, Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 817, 818 (1980) (explaining that “[d]uring most of our history, the national 
government pursued a policy of promoting settlement and private development of the public 
domain.”); see also GATES, supra note 46, at 57 (asserting that “the use of the public lands was to 
be a vital nationalizing factor in American development”). 
 53. Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976, § 102(a)(1), 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1701(a)(1) (statutory numbering omitted). 
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prevailing idea that the public lands were largely intended for 
disposition to private owners.”54 
In the years immediately before and after the passage of FLPMA, 
states and their state and federal representatives became increasingly 
vocal and present with their concerns over federal ownership, 
management, and control—they became increasingly bold in their 
efforts to assert rights or powers over lands within their respective 
states and assertive in arguing that such claims were superior to 
federal claims. Due to the volume and seriousness of the political 
and legal efforts during this period in the late 1960s and 1970s, that 
era became known (for better or worse) as the “Sagebrush 
Rebellion.”55 A variety of legal maneuvers were tried by states and 
others during this period to diminish federal control over public 
lands, although none looked exactly like the TPLA. For example, 
while Nevada passed a law declaring ownership of certain federal 
lands, and while that law was invalidated by a federal district 
court,56 the TPLA does not “declare” that Utah owns land, and 
makes no effort to take land away from the federal government. 
Instead, the TPLA merely articulates the federal government’s duty 
to dispose and demands that it comply. 
The TPLA is sufficiently distinct that it can, as here, be studied 
effectively in isolation apart from the relatively dense history of land 
disputes in the State of Utah and elsewhere in the West.57 Although 
some have called the TPLA a “new Sagebrush Rebellion,”58 the 
 
 54. RASBAND ET AL., supra note 15, at 139. 
 55. For a summary of some of the major state and federal initiatives to limit federal 
ownership or control of lands in the West in what has become known as the “Sagebrush 
Rebellion,” see RASBAND ET AL., supra note 15, at 156–58; see also CDC NOV. 2012 REPORT, supra 
note 42, at 20–23 (describing the major efforts that occurred at the federal and state level during 
the Sagebrush Rebellion). 
 56. See United States v. Nye Cnty., 920 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Nev. 1996) (applying broad 
Property Clause power to reject Nevada’s claims of title using Equal Footing theory). In Nye, for 
example, one could argue that the court only held that Nevada went too far because the state 
claimed ownership outright rather than demanding that the federal government fulfill a duty to 
dispose or return property to the state. And beyond that, even if one cannot or does not wish to 
distinguish the cases, the Nye case is only the opinion of one district court and, therefore, has 
limited precedential effect. 
 57. To fully understand the current state of affairs in Utah, much more of the history of 
land disputes would be extremely helpful, and readers are encouraged to explore other sources 
in this area. To keep this Article relatively focused, however, any more detailed history will be 
left to those other avenues of research. 
 58. See, e.g., Robert Gehrke, Senate Approves Utah’s New Sagebrush Rebellion, SALT LAKE CITY 
TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/53668812-90/utah-federal-lands-
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nature of the TPLA is different from measures that have come before 
it, and the new law involves some very unique legal concerns.59 The 
next Part deals with a selection of these unique legal issues. 
IV. A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF UTAH’S TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS ACT 
Interest groups from a variety of both supportive and opposition 
positions are debating the enforceability and, quite separately, the 
wisdom of H.B. 148.60 In light of the fact that there has not yet been 
much independent legal analysis published on the TPLA,61 this 
Article provides a summary of the legal arguments at issue and 
presents an initial legal assessment of some of those arguments.62 
 
state.html.csp. 
 59. See Johnson, supra note 3 (“‘This is not your father’s sagebrush rebellion,’ said State 
Representative Ken Ivory . . . referring to the wave of antifederal protests that rippled through 
the West in the 1960s and ‘70s. ‘There are very sound legal bases for doing this.’”). 
 60. One of the chief advocacy groups in favor of H.B. 148 is the American Lands Council, 
led by the chief sponsor of the legislation, Utah Representative Ken Ivory. The American Lands 
Council provides several key primary documents along with resources designed to support the 
legislation on their website. See Resources, AM. LANDS COUNCIL, 
http://www.americanlandscouncil.org/resources.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2013); see also ARE 
WE NOT A STATE?, http://www.arewenotastate.com/index.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2013). 
One of the primary organizations advocating against H.B. 148 is the Southern Utah Wilderness 
Alliance (“SUWA”) which makes some resources and commentary available on its website as 
well. See David Garbett, The Facts About HB 148: Unconstitutional, Bad Public Policy and Won’t Help 
Utah Schools, S. UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE (Mar. 23, 2012, 1:18 PM), http://www.suwa.org/ 
2012/03/23/. This Author and David Garbett, staff attorney for the SUWA, debated H.B. 148 on 
January 17, 2013 in a recorded Federalist Society Teleforum. A podcast of that debate (posted 
Feb. 7, 2013) titled “The Future of Public Lands,” is available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/detail/the-future-of-publicly-owned-lands-podcast. 
 61. Other than the Kochan White Paper from which this article is adapted, and to a 
limited extent the CDC reports, the legal analysis published to date has been very limited. One 
of the closest things to a legal summary of the arguments on both sides comes from a twelve 
page, June 2013, Utah Foundation Research Report summarizing some of the arguments for and 
against the TPLA (which cites the Kochan White Paper extensively as one of its sources). The 
Utah Foundation identifies itself as an independent research organization. See MORGAN LYON 
COTTI, UTAH FOUNDATION RESEARCH REPORT NO. 714, SAGEBRUSH REBELLION PART II: ANALYSIS 
OF THE PUBLIC LANDS DEBATE IN UTAH (2013), available at http://www.utahfoundation.org/img/ 
pdfs/rr714.pdf. The Utah Foundation report is, at best, a backgrounder of the general public 
lands debate with an emphasis on the TPLA, with one page devoted to attempting to outline the 
legal arguments for and against the TPLA. Id. at 9. Despite even that outline not being very 
detailed or even comprehensive in outline form, the Utah Foundation Report has some utility in 
providing background (and is one of the only printed sources attempting to outline the legal 
arguments against the TPLA). See generally id. 
 62. This Article provides only an introductory legal analysis. It does not claim to be 
comprehensive of all of the available legal arguments for or against the validity of the TPLA. 
Furthermore, as previously stated, this Article does not intend to explore the policy reasons for 
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Much of the narrative of Utah’s legal case is set forth in 
documents supporting the legislation. Included in those documents 
is what amounts to an outline of the State’s legal theories best seen 
in the “whereas” clauses in Utah’s House Joint Resolution 3 of 
March 16, 2012, passed concurrently with H.B. 148.63 Many of these 
legal arguments were reiterated in Utah’s Senate Joint Resolution 
13, passed in March 2013, and that new resolution noticeably also 
adds substantial language regarding the “expectations” of the State 
of Utah when entering into the Utah Enabling Act consistent with 
the contract-based elements of a legal duty to dispose discussed 
herein (and as articulated in the January 2013 Kochan White 
Paper).64 
This section will consider some of that outline presented by the 
State of Utah, while providing some independent supplemental legal 
material critical to evaluating the legal legitimacy of the TPLA. If 
pressed in court, the State of Utah might make several arguments to 
defend its legislation—including those based on the Equal Footing 
Doctrine, general principles of Federalism, and a Pollard-based 
interpretation of the Property Clause (these theories will be briefly 
addressed at the end of this section). The State’s arguments based 
on the Utah Enabling Act are its strongest, however, and an analysis 
of those legal claims will be taken up in the first subsection below. 
A. An Enforceable Compact/Contract Theory of the Utah Enabling Act with a 
Federal “Duty to Dispose” 
A contract-based theory—including a compact-based duty to 
dispose—is one of the strongest arguments that proponents of the 
TPLA make to support the validity of Utah’s demand.65 The 
 
or against the legislation. It also passes no judgment on any other legislation or initiatives 
designed to adjust the relative positions of the State of Utah and the federal government vis-à-
vis the public lands (such as roads lawsuits, eminent domain legislation, and other unrelated (or 
related but independent) actions). 
 63. H.R.J. RES. 3, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012). 
 64. See Utah S.J. RES. 13. 
 65. A New York Times article—one of the only major, national newspaper articles even 
touching on any coverage of H.B. 148—summarized the proponents’ argument as follows: 
The federal government, Mr. Ivory and other proponents said, reneged on 
Congressional promises going back to the 1800s, which held that Washington’s 
control of tens of millions of acres in the West in national forests, rangelands and 
parks was only temporary. That pledge, they say, was written into contractual 
obligations in the founding documents of many states, and was followed through in 
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argument includes claims that the TPLA simply enforces a promise 
made when Utah became a state that the federal government has 
heretofore seemed unwilling to completely honor and fulfill.66 One 
can argue that the State of Utah has relied on that promise and that 
the TPLA is simply calling in the debt created by the same.67 
Utah’s Enabling Act (“UEA”) establishing its statehood was 
approved July 16, 1894.68 Utah ratified its new constitution on 
November 5, 1895.69 Where required by the UEA, the Utah 
Constitution codified certain parts of the UEA, including relevant 
portions of UEA Section 3.70 This sub-section of this Article will 
focus on whether the Utah Enabling Act71 and its surrounding 
circumstances created a duty to dispose of public lands on the part of 
the federal government as part of its compact with the State of Utah 
memorialized in the UEA. 
The questions become (1) whether, inherent in the original 
compact, the federal government accepted a duty to dispose of the 
public lands it acquired in the UEA; and separately (2) whether the 
State of Utah can enforce such a duty by demanding that the federal 
government live up to its obligation to dispose of such property into 
private hands. Such a duty would include disposal in a manner that 
 
some places but not others. The Midwest and Plains states, for example, are now 
almost entirely private lands, but hop a meridian or two west and the picture changes 
completely. 
Johnson, supra note 3. This is, in fact, consistent with what can be found in public statements 
and speeches supporting H.B. 148. 
 66. An early news report on the TPLA on the day it was signed into law summarized, in 
part, the State of Utah’s likely legal defenses of the Act based on a compact theory of the 
Enabling Act: 
Rep. Ken Ivory, R-West Jordan, and other political leaders have said the bill is an 
effort to exert rights rooted in the 1894 Enabling Act, which led to Utah’s statehood. 
U.S. Sen. Mike Lee, R-Utah, echoed that point Friday. “When we became a state over 
a century ago, we were given a promise — a promise that some will insist was explicit 
in Section 9 of the statehood Enabling Act; others will say (it) was implicit, if not 
explicit,” Lee said. “But the understanding based on what had happened in other 
states was that eventually the federal government would no longer continue to hold 
all of this land in perpetuity.” 
Geraci, supra note 14. 
 67. All respect and reference due again here to Service’s poem. See SERVICE, supra note 1. 
 68. UTAH ENABLING ACT (1894), available at http://archives.utah.gov/research/ 
exhibits/Statehood/1894text.htm. 
 69. See UTAH CONST. 
 70. UTAH CONST. art. III. 
 71. Utah Enabling Act, available at http://archives.utah.gov/research/exhibits/ 
Statehood/18 94text.htm. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014 11:06 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
1152 
would allow the state to timely obtain, receive, or enjoy the benefits 
of tax revenues and other contributions after the land is unlocked 
from the limitations on the imposition of taxes against the lands 
while under federal ownership.72 Upon disposal, the state can also 
otherwise obtain the benefits that generally flow to the state from 
private ownership and investment, which are precluded while public 
lands are retained in federal control.73 
What follows in this Article is an analysis of the UEA generally 
along the lines of this argument. The subsequent discussion then 
examines the contract-based nature of the UEA, reveals selected 
instructive historical analyses of enabling acts as enforceable 
contracts and as creating a duty to dispose, and explains that the 
legal rules for construction of written instruments requires that the 
UEA be read and interpreted as a whole document to give effect to 
the full bargain struck in the agreement. 
Agreements matter; the parties to them should faithfully and 
diligently adhere to their promises. This is true whether such 
agreements are between private parties, a private party and the 
government, or two governments.74 Long-standing precedents 
support the theory that the UEA is a bilateral compact that should 
be treated as if it is, and should be interpreted as, a binding 
contractual agreement. For one thing, the United States Supreme 
Court has consistently held that federal commitments made to the  
 
 
 
 72. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63L-6-103 (West 2012). 
 73. Id. The importance of a state’s ability to tax lands as a rationale against federal 
ownership has been appreciated since the Founding. See C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the 
Federal Government to the Territories and the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43, 68 (1949) 
(“It was never anticipated that the Federal Government would continue to own lands 
indefinitely like a monarch, but that its lands would be cut into states and distributed to bona 
fide settlers, thereby becoming subject to state taxation without doubt.”). 
 74. This Article will focus on the bilateral compact in the nature of a contract. There may 
be a separate line of inquiry analogizing promises in an enabling act to promises made in a 
treaty. After all, “Treaties are an exchange of promises between nations . . . .” Tim Wu, 
Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 579 (2007). They are often complied with as a matter of 
comity between sovereigns, and importantly they are often considered binding even in the 
absence of explicit terms for their enforceability in courts. Id. The intent for enforceability is 
often not in the terms of the treaty because the implication that compliance is demanded is so 
evident and the expectation of enforceability is presumed. Id. Nonetheless, this Article does not 
pursue this avenue of analysis, but it may be interesting and worthwhile in future work to look 
further at the law of treaty commitments as an independent source of law regarding 
enforceability of the promises made in the UEA and other enabling acts. 
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sovereign states at their time of entry into the Union are serious and 
enforceable.75 
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court explained in Andrus v. Utah, 
promises in enabling acts are “‘solemn agreement[s]’ which in some 
ways may be analogized to a contract between private parties.”76 
That statement from the Andrus majority was also reflected in Justice 
Powell’s dissent, which was based on grounds unrelated to this 
matter of interpretation. Justice Powell made note of the relationship 
between federal retention of lands and decreased tax revenue,77 and 
he also recognized the agreements within Utah’s Enabling Act and 
others like it “were solemn bilateral compacts between each State 
and the Federal Government.”78 Powell later in his opinion further 
describes the “bilateral” nature of the compact.79 As he explained 
regarding the facts in Andrus: “Utah has selected land in satisfaction 
of grants made to support the public education of its citizens. Those 
grants are part of the bilateral compact under which Utah was 
admitted to the Union. They guarantee the State a specific quantity 
of the public lands within its borders.”80 And, Powell explained, in 
return, the State agreed not to tax the federal lands and agreed to use 
the lands granted for public education purposes in perpetuity.81 Both 
parties had corresponding rights and duties. 
Moreover, in Andrus, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that 
these compacts anticipate remedies for breach—even against the 
federal government if it fails to perform duties arising under the 
 
 75. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 176 (2009). The Court in 
Office of Hawaiian Affairs emphasized the importance of federal commitments made at entry into 
the Union and the inability for Congress, after giving the State title, to act in a manner that 
clouds that title, explaining: 
“[T]he consequences of admission are instantaneous, and it ignores the uniquely 
sovereign character of that event . . . to suggest that subsequent events [acts of 
Congress] somehow can diminish what has already been bestowed.” [(quoting Idaho 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 284 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)] And that 
proposition applies a fortiori [with even greater force] where virtually all of the State’s 
public lands . . . are at stake. 
Id. 
 76. Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 507 (1980). 
 77. Id. at 522–23 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 523. 
 79. Id. at 539. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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compact.82 Whereas in Andrus the Court found an explicit 
stipulation of the remedy within the compact,83 under the Andrus 
logic and in terms of failing to perform a duty to dispose, the courts 
could presumably find that a remedy of some kind (explicitly or 
impliedly) must exist with the UEA’s duty to dispose if they were to 
find such a duty. A court would then presumably need to find the 
TPLA’s choice of remedy for dealing with a non-performing federal 
government reasonable in light of the implicit or explicit provision 
for such a remedy. 
The critical provisions of the UEA for review are in Section 3 and 
Section 9. The only appropriate way to read these provisions is in 
conjunction with each other and the whole agreement in the UEA.84 
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that it is a “cardinal principle 
of contract construction that a document should be read to give 
effect to all its provisions and to render them consistent with each 
other.”85 Moreover, as the Court has also recognized, “[f]or the 
purposes of construction, we must look to the whole instrument. 
The intention of the parties is to be ascertained by an examination of 
all they have said in their agreement, and not of a part only.”86 
So, we begin our analysis of the text of the UEA by looking at 
the relevant part of Section 3: 
That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare 
that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated 
public lands lying within the boundaries thereof; and to all lands 
lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian 
tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the 
United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the 
disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain 
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the 
United States; . . . that no taxes shall be imposed by the State on  
 
 
 
 
 82. Id. at 506. In Andrus, the Court was considering the compact provision where “[t]he 
United States agreed to cede some of its land to the State in exchange for a commitment by the 
State to use the revenues derived from the land to educate the citizenry.” Id. at 507. 
 83. Id. at 506–08. 
 84. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §7.11, at 263 (1990) (explaining that courts favor 
an interpretation that “gives meaning to the entire agreement”). 
 85. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995). 
 86. Black v. United States, 91 U.S. 267, 269 (1897). 
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lands or property therein belonging to or which may hereafter be 
purchased by the United States or reserved for its use. . . .87 
Section 3’s “forever disclaim” language may lead some to believe 
that Utah’s case for upholding the TPLA is a dead letter. However, it 
must be read in context.88 Even within this section the language 
shows that the parties anticipate that title will at some point be 
extinguished (the “until the title thereto shall have been 
extinguished” language together with the discussion of 
“disposition,” i.e., disposal). When opponents focus only on the 
“forever disclaim” segment of the UEA and say that this one 
sentence settles the case against the TPLA, they are looking at “a 
part only”89 and “a single sentence”90—approaches expressly 
rejected under the rules of construction recognized in the courts and 
supported by U.S. Supreme Court precedents explaining precisely 
such rules. The interpretation of any written instrument must be 
informed by surrounding words and all sections of the document. 
Moreover, the UEA’s language is perfectly consistent with the 
ends to be achieved. The federal government needed clean title to 
lands so that it could dispose of these properties to willing buyers. 
There was a fear that potential buyers would be unwilling to 
purchase lands from either the federal government or the state 
government if the buyers could not be sure which one had superior 
title.91 The UEA resolved that and sent a signal to would-be buyers 
 
 87. Utah Enabling Act §3 (emphasis added). 
 88. Some basic rules of contract interpretation include the following: 
A contract must be construed as a whole, and the intention of the parties is to be 
ascertained from the entire instrument. The contract’s meaning must be gathered 
from the entire context, and not from particular words, phrases, or clauses, or from 
detached or isolated portions of the contract. All the words in a contract are to be 
considered in determining its meaning, and the entire contract in all of its parts 
should be read and treated together. The entire agreement is to be considered to 
determine the meaning of each part. 
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 375 (2012). 
 89. Black, 91 U.S. at 269. 
 90. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 251 (1924). See also Secura Ins. v. Horizon 
Plumbing, Inc., 670 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (“The ‘cardinal rule’ for 
contract interpretation is to ‘ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that 
intention.’ The parties’ intent is presumptively expressed by the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ of 
the policy’s provisions, which are read ‘in the context of the policy as a whole.’”). 
 91. The need for the federal government to serve as an “impartial arbiter” of conflicting 
land claims emerged out of the failings of the Articles of Confederation and the need for 
certainty of title transfers. See Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention and the Constitution’s 
Property Clause: The Original Understanding, 76 COL. L. REV. 327, 372, n.208 (2005) (citing the 
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of the world that the uncertainty of title had been resolved.92 The 
State in return also gave a promise that added further certainty to 
the buyers when it agreed that it did not have the power to interfere 
with the process of disposal or with rights granted through 
disposal.93 The State, as part of its obligation under the compact, 
gave the federal government the clean title and agreed not to 
interfere with the federal disposition—which included not 
prejudicing the private recipients of title gained through disposal.94 
It was necessary to give the United States clean title and for the 
states to accept a duty of noninterference (1) so that the federal 
government could dispose of property with certainty of title which 
would be necessary to attract market purchasers; (2) so that in the 
first instance the United States could directly realize and control the 
gains from the disposals such that it could use the proceeds in 
accordance with its commitments made to the original states such as 
paying off Revolutionary War debts; and (3) so that, because the 
United States would be successful in disposing of property to willing 
buyers at full price (i.e., not discounted by uncertainty), the United 
States could sell at the highest price possible, which also benefited 
the State of Utah because it received a percentage of such sales 
elsewhere in the UEA, particularly Section 9. 
Thus, the State had a selfish interest in wanting the federal 
government to have certain title because it increased the State’s own 
gains under the agreement. Consider Section 9 of the UEA, which 
provides: 
That five per centum of the proceeds of the sales of public lands lying 
within said State, which shall be sold by the United States 
subsequent to the admission of said State into the Union, after 
deducting all the expenses incident to the same, shall be paid to the 
said State, to be used as a permanent fund, the interest of which only 
shall be expended for the support of the common schools within 
said State.95 
 
statements of Governor Edmund Randolph at the Virginia ratifying convention). That same role 
was carried out, in effect, when the federal government became agent of sale for the Western 
lands for which the states disclaimed ownership so as to clean the title of any such disputes. 
 92. Utah Enabling Act §3. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. § 9 (emphasis added). 
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By its language Section 9 entitles the State to proceeds from 
disposals. This means that the State is invested in and relying upon the 
existence of disposal, which, in consideration for this percentage of the 
proceeds, the State agreed to help facilitate by disclaiming rights to 
the unappropriated lands so as to give the seller in the disposal  
market (the federal government) the valuable commodity of certain 
title attached to the disposed of property. 
Basic rules of construction require harmonization of Section 3 
with Section 9.96 By reading the two together, one can see that they 
generate a “duty to dispose.” If the federal government could retain 
the property, the State would never get any benefit from Section 9. It 
is impracticable to believe that the State intended to agree to 
disclaim rights in return for a cut of the sales of those lands (and in 
anticipation therefore that actual sales would occur so that there was 
a cut to be had), yet intended no corresponding obligation that the 
federal government actually dispose of such lands.97 
This interpretation is further strengthened by the words in 
Section 9 proclaiming that the lands ceded in Section 3 “shall be 
sold.”98 This commanding language indicates that disposal was not 
only anticipated but also demanded and expected as a condition of 
the agreement.99 This mandatory language removes from the federal 
 
 96. See, e.g., Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Fitch, 801 F. Supp. 2d 555, 566–67 (S.D. Texas 2011) 
(citations omitted) (explaining that “‘In construing a written contract, the primary concern of 
the court is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument,’” and 
“‘[t]o achieve this objective, courts should examine and consider the entire writing in an effort 
to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered 
meaningless’”). See also, e.g., Nicolson Pavement Co. v. Jenkins, 81 U.S. 452, 456 (1871) (In 
construing a contract “effect, if possible, is to be given to every part of it, in order to ascertain 
the meaning of the parties to it.”). 
 97. Mauran v. Bullus, 41 U.S. 528, 534 (1842) (“In the construction of all instruments, to 
ascertain the intention of the parties is the great object of the court . . . .”); Creason v. 
Peterson, 470 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1970) (“[C]onveyances of property are to be construed in 
accordance with the intentions of the parties . . . .”); Haynes v. Hunt, 85 P.2d 861, 864 (Utah 
1939) (citation omitted) (“‘When language is found in the instrument making the grant, fitted 
to create the grant naturally to be desired by both parties, although not in the usual form of such 
a grant, it should be given its evidently intended force and effect.’”). 
 98. Utah Enabling Act §9 (emphasis added). 
 99. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly called such language “the mandatory ‘shall.’” 
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 660–61 (2007) 
(describing Clean Water Act “shall approve” language as creating a mandatory obligation on 
EPA to approve a state program when listed statutory triggering criteria were met (citing Lopez 
v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress’ “use of a mandatory ‘shall’ . . . to impose 
discretionless obligations”)); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 
26, 35 (1998) (“[T]he mandatory ‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to 
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government the choice to never dispose and instead retain such 
lands as were ceded in the previous part of the UEA. The federal 
retention of these lands deprives the state of revenue that would 
come from, inter alia, (1) the State’s receipt of a guaranteed 
percentage of the proceeds from disposal sales; and (2) the State’s 
ability to tax property after it is disposed into private hands, whereas 
while the federal government retains those lands they are exempt 
from taxation.100 
Some may claim that the “disclaim” language in Section 3 should 
be read as meaning that the federal government received the title 
free and clear of any encumbering duties and that it therefore can 
retain such public lands designated in the UEA. So long as the 
property is unencumbered then perhaps the statement that the 
government may retain or refrain from disposing holds true. 
However, the principle argument in favor of the TPLA is that it calls 
for the disposal of lands that by the very nature of their acquisition 
came with an encumbrance attached. The encumbrance exists within 
the compact and promise—made between two sovereigns—where 
the federal government committed itself to disposal and promised 
that it would exercise its disposal obligations in a manner so that 
both a percentage of the proceeds from the sales would be shared 
with the State, and where the State thereafter would have the 
capacity to tax such lands when disposed into private hands. Thus, 
any “disclaiming” was done with an understanding and expectation 
by the State that the federal government would honor its promise 
and dispose of such lands. Utah’s claim seems more than reasonable 
in light of these promises in Section 9.101 
 
judicial discretion.”); Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (“The word ‘shall’ generally indicates a command that admits of no discretion on the part 
of the person instructed to carry out the directive.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 
1990) (“As used in statutes . . . this word is generally imperative or mandatory.”). 
 100. The CDC Case Statement explained that the disposal was anticipated in the Enabling 
Act and required if the State of Utah is to receive the “benefit of its bargain”: 
The required disposal of the public lands by the United States over time was a 
significant benefit of the bargain made by the State of Utah with the federal government 
at the time of statehood. In addition to the future expectation of taxable lands, Utah 
was also promised 5% of the proceeds from the sale of the public lands held by the 
federal government “which shall be sold” following statehood. 
CDC Nov. 2012 Case Statement, supra note 10. 
 101. Some analogies help demonstrate that demands of this type are not unprecedented in 
law. Beneficiaries of trusts, for example, have rights to demand an account from a trustee. E.g., 
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 966 (2d rev. ed. 1983 & supp. 2009) 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014 11:06 AM 
1133 Case Study of Utah’s H.B. 148 
 1159 
Utah would not be the first to advance this interpretation of the 
“consideration” included in such structuring of the provisions in an 
enabling act. In 1828, for example, Representative Joseph Duncan of 
Illinois delivered a report to Congress from the Committee on Public 
Lands.102 In that report, Duncan contended that the states, by terms 
of the rather uniform enabling acts, expected disposal to occur.103 
Duncan identified a duty to dispose of federally held lands in 
consideration for the states’ giving up rights to such properties and 
surrendering the rights to tax such properties and obtain revenue.104 
Duncan’s statement urged that if the lands are not disposed of, the 
states affected “will for many generations . . . be retarded in 
endeavors to increase their comfort and wealth, by means of works 
of internal improvement, because they have not the power, incident 
to all sovereign States, of taxing the soil, to pay for the benefits 
conferred upon its owner by roads and canals.”105 Duncan 
continued, “When these States stipulated not to tax the lands of the United 
States until they were sold, they rested upon the implied engagement of Congress 
to cause them to be sold within a reasonable time.”106 He further reiterated 
that not disposing of the federal lands would lead to differential 
 
(describing trustees’ duties to render formal accounts for trust property and assets upon demand 
of beneficiary or others, including to “learn whether the trustee has performed his trust and 
what the current status of the trust is” and in some instances upon completion of the accounting 
to order transfers of property). In many ways the federal government has an obligation to both 
Utah and the original states that gave the Western lands to the federal government in trust that 
it would use the lands for limited purposes and ultimately dispose of them. The federal 
government has a fiduciary duty to dispose of the property and do so in a reasonable amount of 
time. Where its delay or refusal to dispose puts the beneficiary in a lesser position—far from 
what would be considered the best interests of the beneficiary—it is violating its fiduciary duty. 
Consider also the existence of “lapse” statutes in some states. Another interesting analogy 
to the Utah effort is the passage of “lapse” statutes in some states where legislation ends 
interests in certain mineral estates within split estates where the mineral estate holder fails to 
use the mineral estate for a certain period of years. With such statutes, ownership generally 
reverts to the owner from which the lesser estate is carved. The statutes are intended to 
encourage the productive use of property. Particularly where the surface estate holder, for 
example, expects royalties from the use of the dormant mineral estate, that surface owner’s 
ability to receive profits from its own estate is impeded by the non-productive use of the mineral 
estate. Such lapse statutes have been seen as a way to more efficiently allocate valuable and 
scarce resources to those that can profit from them, and such statutes have been upheld as 
legitimate exercises of state power. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). 
 102. H.R. Rep. No. 125 (1828). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 3–4. 
 106. Id at 4. 
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treatment between the states as “[n]o just equivalent has been given 
those States for a surrender of an attribute of sovereignty so 
important to their welfare, and to an equal standing with the original 
States.”107 Duncan’s summary of the consequences of non-disposal 
provides a well-stated interpretation of these compacts, and it 
supports reading Sections 3 and 9 together as part of a whole 
agreement, which includes corresponding duties and considerations 
where both parties receive the benefit of their bargain. 
As Farnsworth explains, courts should err on the side of an 
interpretation that ensures that each party receives the benefit of the 
bargain struck in the written instrument.108 The State of Utah can be 
treated fairly under the UEA with some benefit of the bargain 
protected only if it can impose a duty to dispose, as explicitly included in 
Sections 3 or 9 or as implicitly mandated within a comprehensive 
reading of the whole of the UEA.109 If the federal government does 
not dispose of the public lands, then the State will not receive its 
anticipated percentage of the proceeds of sales and will be unable to 
realize taxation and productivity benefits from the private owners 
and their uses of the property. 
There is also a strong argument that the intent and expectations 
of the State of Utah and the federal government at the time of the 
UEA were informed by the predominant ethic in favor of, and 
presumptions toward, the disposal of federally controlled public 
lands into private hands.110 Some have argued that at the founding 
of the United States, there was a “universal expectation that the 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. FARNSWORTH, supra note 84, at 265 (explaining a rule of construction that “the 
assumption [is] that the bargaining process results in a fair bargain, so that, between an 
interpretation that would yield such a bargain as a reasonable person would have made and one 
that would not, the former is preferred”). 
 109. Cf. Flood v. ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 1110, 1125 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The 
intention of the parties to a contract ‘must be gleaned from a consideration of the whole 
instrument.’ And in seeking that intention, ‘an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, 
and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part 
unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect.’” (citations omitted)). 
 110. James R. Rasband & Megan E. Garrett, A New Era in Public Land Policy? The Shift 
Toward Reacquisition of Land and Natural Resources, 53 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 11.02[1] 
(2007); Touton, supra note 52, at 818 (“During most of our history, the national government 
pursued a policy of promoting settlement and private development of the public domain.”). 
Touton explains that “[i]n admitting new states . . . Congress retained ‘unappropriated lands’ 
within their borders and continued its policy of encouraging settlement and development. Nearly all of 
the land in the Midwest and South was distributed in this manner.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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lands would, in fact, be disposed of.”111 Patterson notes that, at the 
Founding, the idea of vast federal retention would have been 
unthinkable, and surely would have been objected to, by the ratifying 
states: 
If the states had had the slightest notion that the Federal 
Government could lay claim to the soil or to its resources or could 
make great reservations of land within their boundaries or of their 
mineral resources as a price of their admission into the Union, thus 
destroying the equality of the states in the Union, the Constitution 
would never have been ratified.112 
The expectation of disposal dates back to these intentions at the 
Constitutional Convention and the promises made to the original 
states that the unappropriated lands would be disposed of. Consider 
the congressional resolution passed on October 10, 1780: 
Resolved, That the unappropriated lands that may be ceded or 
relinquished to the United States, by any particular states, . . . 
shall be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, 
and be settled and formed into distinct republican states, which 
shall become members of the federal union, and have the same 
rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as the other 
states . . . . That the said lands shall be granted and settled at 
such times and under such regulations as shall hereafter be agreed 
on by the United States in Congress assembled.113 
Furthermore, even those who strongly favor federal retention 
have agreed with this history. Gaetke, for example, states that “[i]t 
must be conceded that no delegates could foresee the vast retention 
of federal land ownership that has occurred in states subsequently 
carved from the public domain,”114 and even concedes that “the 
delegates would have opposed such retention if it had been 
 
 111. Natelson, supra note 91, at 368. 
 112. Patterson, supra note 73, at 62. 
 113. 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 915 (1780) 
(congressional resolution of October 10, 1780). 
 114. Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the ‘Classic’ Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617, 638 
(1985). It is important to note that Gaetke also admits that “[t]he language employed by the 
Convention certainly permits congressional implementation of the policies of rapid disposal of 
federal lands.” Id. Thus, he admits that there is nothing in the Constitution that would prohibit 
federal disposal of public lands (and thereby nothing that prohibits the Federal government from 
complying with the demands of legislation such as the TPLA). Gaetke quibbles with any 
arguments that the federal government is constitutionally required to dispose of such lands. 
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foreseen.”115 These attitudes regarding federal land management 
continued through the nineteenth century and surrounded the 
circumstances of, and thereby colored the expectations within, the 
UEA and its drafting.116 These expectations, therefore, must be 
considered in deciding whether one can find a duty to dispose in the 
UEA. 
Utah became a state during this disposal era in public lands law. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that, when interpreting 
contracts, “[t]he intention of the parties is to be gathered, not from 
[a] single sentence . . . but from the whole instrument read in the 
light of the circumstances existing at the time of negotiations leading up to its 
execution.”117 The UEA was entered into against a backdrop of an 
ethic of disposal. Consequently, this ethic informed the expectations 
of the parties and is relevant in interpretation.118 
The disposal ethic constitutes a relevant “state of affairs” that 
must be considered a critical element in the interpretation of a 
compact like the UEA,119 and it lends support to an interpretation of 
the whole document that mandates disposal. The pro-disposal climate 
that existed while the UEA and similar state agreements were 
reached supports the claim that the State of Utah reasonably 
believed that, by making other concessions in the UEA, it would 
later receive consideration for its disclaimed rights in the form of 
payments from Section 9. As Farnsworth explains in his treatise on 
contracts, “It seems proper to regard one party’s assent to the 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Rasband & Garrett, supra note 110 (“Beginning in 1776 and continuing for most of 
the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, the primary goal of the United States was to 
dispose of as much public land as possible.”). 
 117. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 251 (1924) (emphasis added). 
 118. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 84, § 7.10, at 255 (“The overarching principle of contract 
interpretation is that the court is free to look to all of the relevant circumstances surrounding 
the transaction.”); Semi-Materials Co. v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., 655 F.3d 829, 833 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (“When interpreting a written contract under Texas law, the court is ‘to ascertain the 
true intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument.’ To make this determination, we 
‘examine all parts of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the formulation of the 
contract.’” (citations omitted)). 
 119. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Hill, 82 U.S. 94, 100, 103 (1872) (describing the 
rule that the court should give a contract “a fair and just construction, and ascertain the 
substantial intent of the parties, which is the fundamental rule in the construction of all 
agreements,” and such interpretation should “be in accordance with the substance of the 
agreement. It would carry out the intent of the parties as gathered from the whole instrument 
and the state of affairs existing at the time it was made” (emphasis added)). 
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agreement with knowledge of the other party’s general purposes as a 
ground for resolving doubts in favor of a meaning that will further 
those ends, rather than a meaning that will frustrate them.”120 Utah 
“assented” to the UEA with knowledge of the federal government’s 
“general purposes” of disposal. Therefore, finding a meaning in the 
UEA that includes a duty to dispose furthers the ends anticipated by 
the parties, including the revenue stream from disposal considered in 
Section 9. To find disclaimed rights by the State with no 
corresponding duty to dispose would be to adopt a meaning that 
frustrates the expectations of the parties to the UEA (principally the 
State of Utah and the federal government). To find such would also 
unjustly give the federal government a greater benefit than that for 
which it bargained. Again, the parties’ interests within the 
agreement require the existence of some duty requiring the federal 
government to dispose. 
Furthermore, past statements by officials recognized the logic 
and historical underpinnings of a compact-based, duty-to-dispose 
theory. For example, President Andrew Jackson made an eloquent 
and persuasive defense of the compact-based duty to dispose in a 
pocket veto message to Congress.121 Jackson refused to sign 
Congress’ bill because Congress wanted to use public land disposal 
proceeds for certain general, federal purposes rather than comply 
with terms of disposal set out in compacts between the federal 
government and certain states.122 Jackson believed that the 
legislation was based on improper assumptions of federal power vis-
à-vis the lands subject to the bill. He believed the bill failed to 
recognize the necessity of permanent disposals of federal public land 
holdings.123 
 
 
 120. FARNSWORTH, supra note 84, at 258; see also Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 
1952) (“It is also established in this state that a deed should be construed so as to effectuate the 
intentions and desires of the parties, as manifested by the language made use of in the 
deed. . . . [T]he circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the parties, and the 
object to be attained are also to be considered.” (citations omitted)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 202(1) (“[I]f the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great 
weight.”). 
  121. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message of December 4, 1833, in MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS VOL. III (James D. Richardson ed., 1911) [hereinafter Jackson 1833 Veto Message], 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=67041. 
 122. Id. at 56–69. 
 123. Id. 
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Jackson’s veto message stressed the need for a permanent 
resolution of public lands disposition and “[t]he importance, as it 
respects both the harmony and union of the States, of making, as 
soon as circumstances will allow of it, a proper and final disposition 
of the whole subject of the public lands.”124 Jackson started his 
rather long statement with a history lesson on “the manner in which 
the public lands upon which it is intended to operate were acquired 
and the conditions upon which they are now held by the United 
States.”125 He explained that the original states were induced to cede 
their land to the federal government by the promise that the federal 
government eventually would dispose of all of these lands.126 For 
example, the deed of cession from Virginia provided that the lands 
“shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other 
use or purpose whatsoever.”127 
Jackson described the commitment to dispose, found in 
agreements with the original states, as “solemn compacts” where 
“[t]he States claiming those lands acceded to those views and 
transferred their claims to the United States upon certain specific 
conditions, and on those conditions the grants were accepted.”128 By 
vetoing the bill and articulating this interpretation of the federal duty 
to dispose, Jackson was looking out for the interests of “new States” 
and their interest in “the rapid settling and improvement of the 
waste lands within their limits.”129 
Jackson concluded his veto message with a strong argument that 
the agreements with the original states for cession of their rights to 
Western lands and the commitments made to new states could only 
be read as creating a duty to dispose and an obligation to “abandon” 
 
 124. Id. at 57. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 60. 
 128. Id. at 60–61. Jackson touched further upon the binding nature of these compacts: 
The Constitution of the United States did not delegate to Congress the power to 
abrogate these compacts. On the contrary, by declaring that nothing in it “shall be so 
construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any particular State,” it virtually 
provides that these compacts and the rights they secure shall remain untouched by the 
legislative power, which shall only make all “needful rules and regulations” for carrying 
them into effect. All beyond this would seem to be an assumption of undelegated 
power. 
Id. at 64. 
 129. Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
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the property that the federal government cannot, or no longer has a 
financial need to, dispose of. 130 Jackson noted the expectation that 
lands should be sold by the federal government and the “refuse 
remaining unsold shall be abandoned to the States and the 
machinery of our [federal] land system entirely withdrawn.”131 He 
stressed that “[i]t can not be supposed the compacts intended that 
the United States should retain forever a title to lands within the 
States which are of no value, and no doubt is entertained that the 
general interest would be best promoted by surrendering such lands 
to the States.”132 Jackson’s statements support a theory that the 
federal government must at some point “extinguish” their claims to 
title to the public lands obtained in the enabling acts. 
Importantly, Jackson concludes that nothing in existing law 
precludes this interpretation of the duty to dispose, and—almost 
saying that in the absence of a barrier to this interpretation, and 
given that the interpretation makes sense, one should accept his 
interpretation. No law would be broken.133 If nothing precludes the 
interpretation that the federal government must extinguish its rights 
to these public lands at issue, yet many general principles favor an 
interpretation that identifies a duty to dispose, Jackson counsels that 
the latter interpretation in favor of disposal should be chosen.134 
That may be wise counsel for those vacillating on whether to 
embrace a duty to dispose. 
The CDC’s summary of its legal theory supporting the TPLA 
makes some of the arguments articulated and analyzed in the above 
subsection of this Article. The CDC’s theory is based, in part, on an 
expectation of disposal within enabling acts, colored by a sense of 
 
 130. Id. at 68–69. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 69. 
 133. Id. (“This plan for disposing of the public lands impairs no principle, violates no 
compact, and deranges no system.”). Consider also the fact that even proponents of federal 
retention of lands agree that the federal government is not prohibited from disposing of its 
lands. See Gaetke, supra note 114, at 637–38 (discussing the constitutional language and 
concluding that the federal government is permitted to dispose of public lands). Natelson also 
explains the “unqualified nature of the Disposal Power” in the Constitution. Natelson, supra 
note 91, at 364. He states, “That this was the original meaning is corroborated by contemporary 
records showing a universal expectation of disposal, by a congressional ordinance contemplating 
disposal, and a high level of agreement on how lands were to be alienated and how the proceeds 
were to be used.” Id. at 369. 
 134. Id. 
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fairness for the states like Utah where disposal has yet to occur 
(while the federal government largely fulfilled its commitment to 
other states).135 The CDC report contends that “[l]egal justification 
for the transfer of the public lands into State ownership is based on 
the history of federal land policy,”136 stressing the historical 
expectation of disposing of federal lands when it states that, “[f]rom 
the inception of this Nation and through much of its history, it was 
the policy of the federal government to dispose of the public lands 
both to pay off federal debt and to encourage the settlement of 
western lands for the benefit of the states and the nation.”137 The 
CDC report continues to stress that this expectation was met in 
“most of the states east of the Colorado-Kansas state line,” where 
those states “have very little federal public lands within their borders 
as a result of the historical implementation of this policy.”138 The 
CDC concludes that “[t]his policy of disposal was very much a part 
of the various enabling acts that authorized new states to join the 
Union.”139 Furthermore, the CDC explains that the Enabling Act’s 
“disclaimer of title was only intended to facilitate the disposal of the 
public lands so that, eventually such lands would contribute to the 
revenue bases of federal, State and local governments.”140 Once title 
passes from federal hands to private, that property becomes subject 
to state regulation.141 
One perception-based problem with the legal analysis presented 
in this subsection from a “public relations”-type standpoint lies in 
the following: 1) the courts have had occasion to discuss states’ 
obligations under these compacts and in that process courts have 
even contended that these are bilateral contractual agreements—
meaning the federal government has some duties,142 too; but 2) the 
courts have had very little occasion to consider and discuss 
 
 135. CDC Nov. 2012 Case Statement, supra note 10, at 3–4. While the CDC report 
presents its theory of legal validity, it does not seem intended to be a detailed legal analysis. 
 136. Id. at 3. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 3–4. 
 139. Id. at 4. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Irvine v. Marshall, 61 U.S. 558, 567 (1857) (“[B]ut that whenever, according to those 
laws, the title shall have passed, then the property, like all other property in the State, is subject 
to State legislation, so far as that legislation is consistent with the admission, that the title 
passed and vested according to the laws of the United States.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 539 (1980). 
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interpretations of the compacts that identify the duties imposed 
upon the other half of the bi-lateral agreement, the federal 
government. Thus, opponents to the TPLA invoke broad statements 
about federal power when the States overstep in relation to the 
compacts and call them “precedents” for the present case of the 
TPLA’s legitimacy.143 Opponents highlight these broad statements 
even though the language used in those cases went beyond what was 
necessary for their holdings and are, therefore, of little to no 
precedential value. 
But on the other side of the debate, advocates favoring the TPLA 
hold almost no directly-responsive “precedential” cards—real 
controlling precedent or even dicta pretending-to-be precedent—as 
there are almost no cases about the states’ powers when the federal 
government oversteps its obligations or fails to fulfill its promises in 
these compacts. The advocates of laws like the TPLA must employ 
the power and skill of distinguishing cases and educate the courts 
and the public about when some seemingly precedential judicial 
statements are distinguishable or are actually dicta. The next 
subsection dissects some of the most often touted precedential 
obstacles to upholding the TPLA. 
B. Distinguishing Cases and Identifying Dicta: The Limited Legal 
Commentary and Arguments Against the Validity of the TPLA 
The major legal arguments against the TPLA rest on broad 
interpretations of the Property Clause in the U.S. Constitution 
Article IV, Section 3.144 This constitutional provision provides: “The 
Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules 
and regulations respecting the Territory or other property belonging 
to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so 
construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any 
 
 143. See, e.g., Richard Shaw, The Case Against Transferring Public Lands to Utah, SUN ADVOC. 
(Carbon County, Utah) (July 11, 2013), http://www.sunad.com/index.php?tier=1&article_id 
=28643 (surveying the arguments of opponents to the TPLA); Marty Trillhaase, Opinion: Isn’t 
Something About this Movie Familiar?, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. (Lewiston, Idaho) (July 24, 2013), 
http://lmtribune.com/opinion/article_b82479f8-6965-5515-98c2-e8b3f00fb605.html (criticizing 
the TPLA efforts in Idaho and fatalistically asking “Come on . . . . [d]o you really think the 
federal courts will reverse two centuries of case law just for Idaho’s convenience? We all know 
how this ends.”). 
 144. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
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particular state.”145 The Property Clause does indeed confer broad 
powers to Congress, but it is not without limitations.146 
Setting aside the validity or invalidity of any of the arguments 
made by TPLA opponents in relation to other and separate measures 
taken by the State of Utah or others to realize state control of 
currently federally held lands, the primary arguments made against 
the TPLA miss their target, and the authorities relied upon by TPLA 
opponents are almost entirely inapposite. This section sets forth the 
primary reasons why the cited precedent against the TPLA is either 
dicta or otherwise inapplicable to the TPLA debate. 
This section accomplishes two main goals. First, it deconstructs 
the lofty and overbroad language in several cases that opponents of 
the TPLA claim as dispositive precedent. This section will focus on 
distinguishing the seemingly broad interpretations of the Property 
Clause that are claimed to weigh in favor of finding the TPLA invalid 
or unconstitutional. It does so by looking at the cherry-picked bits of 
language offered by opponents within the full context of the cases 
where the language appears. It will examine these bits of language in 
light of the limited holdings in the cases where such language 
appeared but was not necessary to resolve the cases. It also will 
identify many of these broad “interpretations” as nothing more than 
non-controlling dicta. Second, this section will reiterate the idea that 
the UEA and its duty to dispose act as limitations on the Property 
Clause power, the likes of which were never considered or discussed 
in any of the cases where broad Property Clause powers were 
heralded. 
Much of what is being cited as “precedent” against the TPLA is 
not precedent at all. Instead, much of this claimed precedent either 
resides in categories of excessive dicta or in unrelated cases 
contextually distinct from, and not on point with, the TPLA. At 
times, courts say in a case opinion more than is necessary to resolve 
the case.147 They can be verbose and sometimes they overstate 
background principles. And sometimes in the process they use 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. See generally, e.g., Natelson, supra note 91; Patterson, supra note 73; Touton, supra note 52. 
 147. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1011 
(2005) (“If we accept the premise that judges are motivated to advance their views of legal 
policy, a substantial risk arises that ambitious judges operating within a stare decisis system will 
use the cases that they decide to announce their preferred views of law and public policy as 
‘holdings.’”). 
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excess language that is susceptible to interpretations beyond what 
the judges would have meant to say had they been able to fully 
predict the misuse of their words. “There is no denying . . . the 
importance of understanding—both as a matter of theory and at the 
level of practice—how to approach such a central task as sorting 
holding and dicta,”148 and that task must be undertaken when 
evaluating the Property Clause cases cited against the TPLA. 
One of the classic statements regarding the definition of dicta 
and its non-controlling nature comes from Chief Justice John 
Marshall in the seminal case of Cohens v. Virginia.149 There, the Court 
stated that: 
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in 
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which 
those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be 
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent 
suit, when the very point is presented for decision.150 
One of the reasons to treat dicta as non-binding is because it 
involves statements regarding points of law not thoroughly evaluated 
in part because the facts do not present themselves in the case and 
the parties are unlikely to have briefed all of the relevant arguments 
necessary for a court to reach an informed decision on the broader 
points.151 Indeed, it is beyond the power of a court to decide more 
than the case or controversy before it,152 further supporting the 
conclusion that dicta lacks authority. The non-controlling effect of 
 
 148. Id. at 958. See also Comment, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REV. 509, 513 (1952); 
Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 180 (1930). 
 149. 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 399–400. As the Court explained, “The reason of this maxim is obvious,” 
because “[t]he question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its 
full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to 
the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely 
investigated.” Id. See also David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in 
Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2012, 2027 (2013) (“The distinction 
between holding and dictum reflects fundamental norms of American law, from the common law 
precept that legal principles develop incrementally, with any one decision having only a limited 
impact, to Article III’s requirement that judges decide concrete disputes and not issue advisory 
opinions.”). 
 152. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 14 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael 
Ansaldi trans., 1989) (“[C]ourt can decide nothing but the legal dispute before it. . . . 
Everything, but everything, said in an opinion is to be read and understood only in relation to 
the actual case before the court.”). 
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dicta serves both legitimacy functions, ensuring that courts resolve 
only cases before them rather than making “law in the abstract,” and 
instrumental functions, including cabining holdings to those things 
actually carefully considered and argued before a court.153 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines obiter dictum—which it notes is 
coterminous with dictum—as “[a] judicial comment made while 
delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the 
decision in the case and therefore not precedential.”154 This concept 
of “extra” or “unnecessary” language is ever present in most of the 
cases discussed in this section. These statements that go beyond 
what is necessary to decide a case simply do not have precedential 
effect.155 While there is some scholarly commentary regarding the 
difficulties in defining dicta, most recognize that surplus language 
and positions taken that are broader than necessary to decide a case 
are beyond the holding and, therefore, not precedential.156 
We should not be surprised to find dicta in the Property Clause 
cases nor should we be surprised that some will gravitate toward it 
to support their position. Additionally, lower courts may think they 
must obey the dicta of higher courts. Unfortunately, lower courts 
often make the same error as the proponents of the TPLA, giving 
undue weight to higher court dicta.157 Dicta is not uncommonly  
 
 
 
 153. Michael Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000–01 (1994); Pierre N. 
Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1255–60 (2006). 
See also Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 147, at 1021–22 (“The holding-dicta distinction 
similarly should serve both functions, delaying resolution of issues until judges can properly 
consider them and encouraging judges to focus on the issues before them.”). 
 154. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (8th ed. 2004). 
 155. EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES § 13, at 18–19 (2d ed. 1894) (“So far as the 
opinion goes beyond a statement of the proposition of law necessarily involved in the case, the 
words contained in the opinion, whether they be right or wrong, are not authority of the highest 
order, but are merely words spoken, dicta, obiter, or obiter dicta.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 147, at 1065 (“A holding consists of those 
propositions along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, 
(2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment. If not a holding, a 
proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.”). 
 157. See Klein & Devins, supra note 151, at 2026, 2036. A particular risk is that an 
appellate court will issue sweeping statements that should be dicta, hoping that the lower courts 
and others will treat such statements like holdings. Id. at 2021 (“Higher courts can issue 
sweeping rulings that address questions not immediately before them, knowing that those 
statements will not be treated as dicta.”); Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 147, at 995 
(identifying “the risk that judges will present overly broad written opinions as precedent”). 
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used by courts, and one must therefore keep a watchful eye for it and 
not overstate the precedential effects of dicta in court opinions.158 
Critics of the TPLA have been focused on making largely 
conclusory statements that the TPLA is invalid159 and, where they 
cite to cases, such critics have often relied on nothing more than 
distinguishable dicta. Consider, for example, a research note 
attached to H.B. 148.160 On February 4, 2012, the Utah Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel appended its “Legislative 
Review Note” to the introduced version of H.B. 148 “as required by 
legislative rules and practice.”161 Despite the near conclusive effect 
 
 158. See Klein & Devins, supra note 151, at 2032–33 (“[T]here have been fairly frequent 
reports in recent years of failures to distinguish between dictum and holding. Academics 
contend that judicial opinions ‘are often larded with dicta,’ including ‘passing observations, 
generalizations, analogies, illustrations, or asides not necessary to the resolution of the case.’”); 
Leval, supra note 153, at 1263 (“I cannot tell you how many times I have read briefs asserting an 
improbable proposition of law and citing a case as authority . . . [only to find that] the 
proposition is indeed there, but was uttered in dictum.”). 
 159. Consider, for example, one of the only major national news articles to cover the TPLA 
that makes some bold statements about the law’s chances of being upheld if challenged. See 
Johnson, supra note 3. Johnson’s article reports on failures of past efforts by States to restrain 
federal power over Western lands in light of broad precedent in favor of the federal 
government’s Property Clause powers. Id. He then claims that “[m]any legal experts say they 
expect the same result this time.” Id. Furthermore, the article proceeds to claim that “[l]egal 
experts said the problem for the new state claims was that Congressional authority over federal 
land had been upheld over and over by the United States Supreme Court. If property rights are 
the issue being raised, many experts said, proponents of the new land drive are facing traditions 
and precedents that run deep in the law and culture.” Id. I do not doubt that many legal experts 
will rely on the breadth of dicta in sometimes seemingly relevant case precedent and find that 
Utah faces an uphill battle. However, opponents should not rely too much on the Johnson article 
for their claim of legal illegitimacy. That article proceeds to identify and quote only one expert, 
Professor Charles F. Wilkinson of the University of Colorado. Id. As there seem to be very few 
experts publicly weighing in on the issue so far in any manner, I think the “most experts” claim 
in the article is probably unsupported (although I make no claim to know how many legal 
academics will line up against the law should it start to receive more attention and therefore 
cause such legal commentators to form an opinion). 
A news article discussing the New Mexico TPLA legislation printed statements that are 
similarly illustrative of the conclusory nature of most opposition claims. See Stella Davis, New 
Mexico Lands Commissioner Says Federal Land Swap Would Be “Catastrophic”, CARLSBAD CURRENT-
ARGUS (Carlsbad, N.M.) (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.currentargus.com/carlsbad-
news/ci_22588817/new-mexico-lands-commissioner-says-federal-land-swap (saying that the 
New Mexico lands commissioner “believes the transfer would be unconstitutional” but without 
providing any further analysis for that claim). 
 160. UTAH OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH & GEN. COUNSEL, TRANSFER OF PUBLIC LANDS 
ACT AND RELATED STUDY: LEGISLATIVE REVIEW NOTE [hereinafter H.B. 148 Legislative Review 
Note], http://le.utah.gov/~2012/bills/hbillint/hb0148.pdf (appended to H.B. 148 as introduced 
Feb. 4, 2012). 
 161. Id. 
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some opponents of the legislation have tried to give the Legislative 
Review Note, the authors specifically explain that the Note is 
designed to “provide information relevant to legislator’s 
consideration of this bill” and not to “influenc[e] whether the bill 
should become law” and it is “not a substitute for the judgment of 
the judiciary” on the constitutionality of the TPLA.162 
After citing the Property Clause, the Legislative Review Note 
relies on statements in United States v. Gratiot,163 Kleppe v. New 
Mexico,164 and Gibson v. Chouteau.165 The Legislative Review Note 
concludes that, in light of these precedents and “[u]nder the Gibson 
case, that requirement [in H.B. 148 of the federal government to 
extinguish title] would interfere with Congress’ power to dispose of 
public lands. Thus, that requirement, and any attempt by Utah in the 
future to enforce the requirement, have [sic] a high probability of 
being declared unconstitutional.”166 
A closer look at each of the cases cited in the Legislative Review 
Note reveals that they do not support that legal conclusion and 
prediction. The Note starts with this claim: 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that “Congress 
has the same power over [territory] as over any other property 
belonging to the United States; and this power is vested in 
Congress without limitation . . . .” United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 
526, 537 (1840). See also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 
(1976). Pursuant to its broad authority under the Property Clause, 
Congress may enact legislation to manage or sell federal land, and 
any legislation Congress enacts “necessarily overrides conflicting 
state laws under the Supremacy Clause.” Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543. 
See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.167 
After examining each case in turn below, it should become 
evident that these quotations from case law cited by the Legislative 
Review Note are valueless for the interpretation of the TPLA and 
certainly create no controlling precedent to be applied in any 
challenge to the TPLA. 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840). 
 164. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
 165. 80 U.S. 92 (1872). 
 166. H.B. 148 Legislative Review Note, supra note 160. 
 167. Id., at 7. 
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Gratiot, for example, does little to inform an interpretation of the 
TPLA. Its holding was that the Property Clause “authorize[s] the 
leasing of the lead mines on the public lands, in the territories of the 
United States” the terms of which would be enforceable.168 It also 
stands for the proposition that property rights created prior to 
statehood could not be upset by a new state.169 There is nothing in 
Gratiot that would require a determination that Congress has plenary 
power under the Property Clause so broad that it may ignore all 
other possible duties to states or others.170 This “without 
limitation” language is only dicta unnecessary to resolve the case. 
The Gratiot case seems of little value in any legal controversy over 
the TPLA as the facts have no similarity to the questions regarding 
the TPLA. 
Similarly, Kleppe has limited value in any TPLA dispute, and the 
Note’s reliance on it is misplaced. Kleppe simply holds that a state 
law allowing the state to come onto federal land and rustle up and 
later auction burros is unconstitutional because it interferes with 
federal management policies while the federal government is an 
owner of public lands.171 The holding says nothing either in favor of 
or against giving Congress a power to ignore other commitments to 
dispose of property like it made in the UEA. 
The Kleppe holding simply maintains that while the federal 
government is an owner, states have a type of “duty of 
noninterference” with federally controlled lands (including refraining 
from passing laws that conflict with the federal policies while the 
federal government occupies such lands).172 If a state passes a law 
that so interferes, then it will be subject to conflict or other 
preemption doctrines, and the Supremacy Clause will indeed make 
the federal law control over the state one.173 But again, there was no 
 
 168. Gratiot, 39 U.S. at 524. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 147, at 1029 (“[N]onsupportive propositions 
should count as presumptive dicta” and as such dicta exists “[w]here a judge resolves an issue in 
a manner that does not contribute to the disposition of the case.”). 
 171. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976). 
 172. Id. at 540–41. See also Touton, supra note 52, at 825 (discussing Kleppe and concluding 
with yet another argument that “[a]lthough the Kleppe decision was unanimous, its assertion 
that the property power is ‘without limitations’ should not be accepted uncritically. The property 
power, like all other congressional powers, is circumscribed by external limitations found in the 
Bill of Rights and elsewhere in the Constitution.”). 
 173. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539–40. 
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need to grant Congress some truly “unlimited” Property Clause 
power to reach this holding in Kleppe. In the Kleppe case, unlike in a 
challenge to the TPLA, there were no other relevant laws 
(comparable to, for example, the UEA) to consider other than the 
interfering municipal law that was invalidated.174 
It is true that with conflict preemption in the Kleppe case, the 
Supremacy Clause mandated that the federal law over burros win out 
against a conflicting state law.175 But that holding says nothing of 
whether the state can demand that the federal government honor its 
promises and perform its duties. And it says nothing about when 
and whether there can be an enforceable demand for adherence if the 
state is the beneficiary of those promises. 
The Legislative Review Note also quoted, at length, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1872 decision in Gibson v. Chouteau: 
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that “[w]ith 
respect to the public domain, the Constitution vests in Congress 
the power of disposition and of making all needful rules and 
regulations. That power is subject to no limitations. Congress has 
the absolute right to prescribe the times, the conditions, and the 
mode of transferring this property, or any part of it, and to 
designate the persons to whom the transfer shall be made. No State 
legislation can interfere with this right or embarrass its exercise; 
and to prevent the possibility of any attempted interference with it, 
a provision has been usually inserted in the compacts by which new 
States have been admitted to the Union, that such interference with 
the primary disposal of the soil of the United States shall never be 
made.” Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92 (1872).176 
The Legislative Review Note and most opponent arguments 
seem to focus on the claim in Gibson that “[n]o State legislation can 
interfere with this [Property Clause] right or embarrass its 
exercise.”177 Gibson does not, however, resolve the issue of whether 
the TPLA violates the Property Clause. 
Gibson only held that a state cannot interfere with a disposal and 
that incident to what might be called a “duty of noninterference with 
disposal” on the part of the state, there is also a prohibition on the 
 
 174. See generally id. 
 175. Id. at 546. 
 176. H.B. 148 Legislative Review Note, supra note 160. 
 177. Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 99 (1872). 
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state “depriving the grantees of the United States of the possession 
and enjoyment of the property granted by reason of any delay in the 
transfer of the title after the initiation of proceedings for its 
acquisition.”178 The Gibson decision equates any measure a state 
takes to deprive the transferee of “the right to possess and enjoy the 
land,” with “a denial of the power of disposal in Congress.”179 While 
Gibson demonstrates that a state may not interfere with U.S. 
ownership or disposal—such as by adversely affecting the buyers’ 
market for government property by creating discriminatory or 
disadvantageous rules on purchasers of federal government disposed 
property180—it does not speak to whether a state may, nonetheless, 
demand that the federal government follow through on promises 
made to the state to eventually dispose, in some manner or another, 
of the property it holds rather than to retain it. Those interpreting 
opinions must be diligent in evaluating possible uses of dicta in the 
face of its overuse,181 like here, when a court says more than what is 
necessary to resolve the case. 
Consider also another case, Irvine v. Marshall, which is not 
discussed in the Legislative Review Note, but, nonetheless, could be 
claimed to support opponents of the TPLA.182 While Irvine indicated 
broad authority for the federal government over its property in the 
Territories “to be disposed of to such persons, at such times, in such 
modes, and by such titles as the Government may deem most 
advantageous to the public fisc, or in other respects most politic,”183 
all of that language still anticipates disposal and merely constrains 
State power to interfere with the government while it owns the public 
lands or in the legally effective transfer of such lands.184 The focus in 
Irvine was on questions regarding “what mode, and by what title, the 
public lands shall be conveyed,”185 and the mechanics of effective 
disposal that should remain in the discretionary control of the 
federal government while it owns lands. But, Irvine hints at nothing  
 
 
 178. Id. at 100. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Klein & Devins, supra note 151, at 2048–49. 
 182. 61 U.S. 558 (1857). 
 183. Id. at 561–62. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 558. 
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about the power to retain public lands (especially those lands 
encumbered with a duty to dispose) indefinitely.186 
The holdings in all of these cases relied upon by opponents of 
the TPLA state that, when the federal government acts as it is 
empowered to act, the states may not impede the federal powers to 
manage the public lands, nor may they intervene to diminish the 
federal government’s capacity to dispose.187 These holdings are 
about not interfering when the federal government has discretion to act 
and is operating within that discretion. These holdings say nothing 
at all about whether the state may demand that the federal 
government comply with an affirmative duty to act. 
A similar legislative review memorandum was written in the 
State of Wyoming that was designed to inform the Wyoming 
Legislature about the consequences of adopting legislation in that 
state similar to Utah’s TPLA.188 This is one of the few other legal 
analyses that this Author has found regarding the constitutional 
validity of the TPLA. It is a very short and conclusory analysis, 
relying (like the Utah Legislative Review Note) on overbroad and 
inapplicable dicta to make its point.189 The memorandum quotes 
United States v. Gratiot, and it also relies upon broad Supremacy 
Clause language in Kleppe and Gibson.190 The flaws in those analogies 
are described above. 
But the Wyoming memorandum also uses a few cases that are 
not discussed in the Utah Legislative Review Note191—most 
 
 186. See generally id. 
 187. See generally, e.g, H.B. 148 Legislative Review Note, supra note 160 (discussing cases 
and mischaracterizing their precedential impact). See also Vince Rampton, My View: Finding the 
Proper Balance Between State, Federal Land Interests, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City) (Aug. 12, 
2012), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/765596366/Finding-the-proper-balance-between-
state-federal-land-interests.html?pg=all (Democratic candidate for lieutenant governor of Utah 
focusing on the Legislative Note’s claims that there is a high probability of finding the TPLA 
unconstitutional). 
 188. Memorandum from Josh Anderson and Matt Obrecht, Wyo. Legislative Serv. Office 
Staff Attorneys to Members of State of Wyo. Legislature Minerals Comm., Utah Land Transfer of 
Public Lands Act, Utah 2012 HB 148, (Oct. 9, 2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wyoming 
Legislative Memo] (“Memorandum discusses likely conflicts with the United States Constitution 
and the Constitution of the State of Wyoming if a similar piece of legislation [to H.B. 148] were 
introduced and passed in Wyoming.”). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. The memorandum also has some rather unsupportable points such as an argument 
that “shall” can be voluntary and not mandatory. See id. 
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important among these are Shannon v. United States,192 Utah Power & 
Light Co. v. United States,193 United States v. Gardner,194 and Light v. 
United States.195 In addition, the case cited in Light (Camfield v. United 
States)196 must be discussed, as it serves as the origin for one of the 
most often-used claims of plenary retention power for Congress vis-
à-vis the public lands. 
Each of these cases, like the others discussed above, can be 
distinguished from any arguments related to the TPLA. Shannon had 
only a limited holding irrelevant to the facts of the TPLA.197 The 
appeals court in Shannon held that the State of Montana, through its 
laws, could not grant its citizens a right to pasture on federal public 
lands and, in essence, authorize a trespass.198 So long as the 
government held the lands and had not yet disposed of them, it 
could maintain a trespass action against such individuals.199 Before 
getting to that limited holding, the court in Shannon repeated some 
of the rhetoric on broad federal powers, but it had neither the 
occasion nor the necessity to evaluate the limits of such powers in 
the face of separately identifiable constraints on the power.200 
Utah Power & Light only held that a state could not interfere with 
the federal government’s use and enjoyment of its property while the 
federal government owned the property and, therefore, the state’s 
attempt to exert the power of easement over federal lands was 
invalid.201 The otherwise broad statements unnecessary to that 
limited holding are dicta and have no precedential effect. Put simply, 
here as with the general rule, dicta is weighted differently from 
holdings; it is not entitled to precedential effect and does not limit a 
future court facing an issue distinct from the resolved issues related 
to the actual facts in a previous case.202 
 
 192. 160 F. 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1908). 
 193. 230 F. 328, 339 (8th Cir. 1915), modified on other grounds, 242 F. 924 (1917). 
 194. 107 F.3d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 195. 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911). 
 196. 167 U.S. 524 (1897). 
 197. Shannon, 160 F. at 875. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 230 F. 328, 339 (8th Cir. 1915), modified on 
other grounds, 242 F. 924 (1917). 
 202. See Klein & Devins, supra note 151, at 2024 (“Dictum and holding are usually thought 
to be entitled to very different weight in the American legal system, as in other common law 
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Gardner holds that “[t]he United States was not required to hold 
public lands it received in various treaties with foreign nations or 
sovereign tribes for the establishment of future states.”203 Although 
Gardner cited the language in Light regarding Congress’s power to 
withhold property from sale, that language had no bearing on the 
holding in Gardner204 and, therefore, should have no precedential 
effect. Again, that language is overly broad and dicta only. 
In Light, too, the Court there made a few seemingly broad 
statements about the reach of the Property Clause.205 The following 
paragraph is the one from which Gardner quotes and the one most 
likely to be cited by TPLA critics: 
But “the nation is an owner, and has made Congress the principal 
agent to dispose of its property. . . . Congress is the body to 
which is given the power to determine the conditions upon which 
the public lands shall be disposed of.” Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 
196 U.S. 126, 49 L. ed. 412, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211. “The government 
has, with respect to its own lands, the rights of an ordinary 
proprietor to maintain its possession and to prosecute trespassers. 
It may deal with such lands precisely as a private individual may 
deal with his farming property. It may sell or withhold them from 
sale.” Canfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 524, 42 L. ed. 262, 17 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 864.206 
The holding in Light, however, is quite limited. The Light 
opinion used that broad rhetorical language only as dicta in reaching 
a far narrower and unexceptional holding that the federal 
government had the power—like any owner—to expel 
trespassers.207 Light simply borrowed the broad language to reach its 
holding that the federal government “may . . . as an owner, object 
to its property being used for grazing purposes, for ‘the government 
is charged with the duty and clothed with the power to protect the 
public domain from trespass and unlawful appropriation,’”208 but no  
 
 
 
systems.”). 
 203. Wyoming Legislative Memo, supra note 188. 
 204. United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 205. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1911). 
 206. Id. at 536. 
 207. Id. at 537. 
 208. Id. at 536. 
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broader Property Clause power needed to be found to resolve that 
case.209 
Similarly, the Camfield case, where the Court first used the 
unnecessarily verbose language of “may sell or withhold them from 
sale,”210 was also about trespassers on federal lands.211 The Court 
used the quoted language in a long paragraph discussing incidents of 
ownership, but it did not reach a holding that was anywhere near the 
issue of whether the federal government has discretion to withhold 
lands from sale where the federal government might otherwise have 
committed itself to dispose of such lands.212 The Camfield holding 
can be summarized loosely as saying the following: The fact that the 
federal government has not yet sold (or, to phrase it differently, has 
currently withheld from sale) a parcel does not mean that a private 
individual can just step in, put a fence around the property, and call 
it his own simply on the defense that the federal government has not 
sold it.213 That hardly amounts to a holding that creates a precedent 
for a sweeping and plenary power on the part of the federal 
government to withhold from sale any public lands it wishes to 
retain. And of even further importance, the Camfield Court had 
absolutely no occasion to consider the powers of the United States in 
light of the federal government’s independently existing duties or 
commitments to dispose of public lands, as, for example, in the 
commitment it made to Utah.214 
Other Property Clause cases are similar to those discussed 
here—they have almost nothing to say about a duty-to-dispose 
theory and instead focus on what a state may do while the federal 
government is an owner.215 There is a difference between 
 
 209. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 147, at 1037 (“[P]ropositions that are hypothetical 
should count as dicta” as should those statements that are unnecessary to some holding in the 
case). 
 210. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 528. 
 213. Id. at 525–26. 
 214. See generally id. 
 215. See, e.g., Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying 
Kleppe to determine whether Congress’s legislative or management power over public lands is 
plenary); United States v. Utah Power & Light Co., 209 F. 554, 557 (8th Cir. 1913) (explaining 
that the federal government can control public lands as part of its protection over property that 
it could dispose of and “[h]aving the power of disposal and of protection, Congress alone can 
deal with the title, and no state law, whether of limitations or otherwise, can defeat such title” 
(quoting Jourdan v. Barrett, 45 U.S. 169, 185 (1846))). 
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interference with administration of federal holdings or interference 
with the disposition process and a quite distinct demand for some 
disposition by the federal government in adherence with its own 
promises. 
In its October 2012 Term, the Supreme Court had occasion to 
quote Marshall’s lessons regarding dicta from Cohens v. Virginia in a 
case particularly apt to the discussion of the federal lands cases here 
in question.216 In Arkansas Game & Fish Commmission v. United States, 
the government attempted to argue that a single sentence from a 
previous case, Sanguinetti v. United States,217 resolved the issue of 
whether temporary flooding ever constitutes a “taking” of private 
property for Fifth Amendment purposes. In the 1924 Sanguinetti 
opinion, the Court had loosely stated “in order to create an 
enforceable liability against the Government, it is, at least, necessary 
that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and constitute 
an actual, permanent invasion of the land.”218 In Arkansas Game & 
Fish, the government tried to argue that because the Saguinetti Court 
used the word “permanent” that it meant to exclude “temporary” 
flooding from being deemed a physical invasion sufficient to be 
called a taking; and, therefore, it argued that the Court had already 
resolved that temporary floodings were indeed constitutional and did 
not trigger the Takings Clause.219 This structure of argument sounds 
strikingly similar to the argument by TPLA opponents that because 
the Court has issued broad statements regarding the States’ power to 
interfere with federal lands while the federal government holds those 
lands, it must follow that the Court has also already decided any and 
all other cases regarding States rights to federal lands including 
rights under a compact-based duty. 
In Arkansas Game & Fish, the Supreme Court rejected the 
government’s interpretation and attempted stretching of the 
sentence beyond its original, limited usage. The Court explained that 
the “sentence in question [from Sanguinetti] was composed to 
summarize the flooding cases the Court had encountered up to that 
point, which had unexceptionally involved permanent, rather than 
 
 216. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012). 
 217. 264 U.S 146 (1924). 
 218. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 520 (quoting Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 
U.S 146, 149 (1924)). 
 219. Id. (“The Government would have us extract from this statement a definitive rule that 
there can be no temporary taking caused by floods.”). 
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temporary, government-induced flooding. But . . . no distinction 
between permanent and temporary flooding was material to the 
result in Sanguinetti.“220 One can argue that, similarly, any public 
lands cases with broad language currently on the books state, at best, 
some generalities regarding only the limited state interference cases 
the courts have resolved up to this point, which have 
unexceptionally never dealt with the federal government’s compact-
based obligations to the States. 
In Arkansas Game & Fish, the Court concluded that one word and 
one sentence from a previous case regarding matters not necessary to 
that previous case have no precedential weight. “We do not read so 
much into the word ‘permanent’ as it appears in a nondispositive 
sentence in Sanguinetti,” the Court stated.221 It continued by 
explaining that the Court will “resist reading a single sentence 
unnecessary to the decision as having done so much work,” and 
quoted the “sage observation” of Chief Justice Marshall against the 
use of dicta as support.222 One might say that those TPLA 
opponents who depend on isolated, nondispositive sentences from 
the public lands cases likewise ask those sentences to carry a load 
and labor far greater than the courts will allow. 
Most of the cases decided across the years under the Property 
Clause have focused on the states’ obligations and commitments 
under the compacts—such as the obligation not to intervene in 
Federal use or disrupt the sanctity of federal disposal agreements—
but very little case law has examined the flip side of the compacts: 
the obligations and commitments agreed to by the federal 
government. A compact is not a one-way street. 
The statements by courts that states cannot interfere in federal 
affairs while the federal government owns property do not necessarily 
say anything about whether the federal government has a duty to 
dispose of that property in some manner and at some point in  
 
 
 
 
 
 220. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 221.   Id. 
 222. Id. 
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time.223 It is the latter duty that is embodied in the demand made by 
the State of Utah in the TPLA. 
C. The Equal Footing Doctrine, Federalism, Pollard-Based Interpretation of 
the Property Clause Power, and Other Legal Arguments 
The State of Utah may have some additional theories to defend 
the TPLA beyond the compact-based duty to dispose. Primary among 
these theories would be those that rely on the Equal Footing 
Doctrine and general Federalism principles,224 along with a narrow 
interpretation of the Property Clause power envisioned in language 
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1845 decision in Pollard v. Hagan.225 
The Equal Footing Doctrine and Federalism principles can serve 
two purposes for those advocating for the TPLA’s validity. First, 
these principles could simply be employed as background principles 
that color an interpretation of the Enabling Act that finds the 
existence of a compact-based duty to dispose. Additionally, they 
could help support efforts to resolve any ambiguities in the Enabling 
Act. These policies generally weigh in favor of greater state 
autonomy and can therefore be used to help distinguish the 
 
 223. Because the broad and lofty statements of federal powers regarding public lands have 
been made in cases analyzing whether states have interfered with federal prerogatives rather 
than whether the federal government has made a commitment that requires the federal 
government itself to take certain affirmative steps, that case law can be distinguished and at the 
very least should not be so over-stated as conclusive of the issues at play with the validity or 
constitutionality of the TPLA. 
 224. For a summary of these doctrines, see generally Touton, supra note 52. Consider also 
the Northwest Ordinance, proclaiming that: 
[T]o provide also for the establishment of States, . . . and for their admission to a 
share in the federal councils on an equal footing with the original States 
. . . . 
. . . The legislatures of those . . . new States, shall never interfere with the primary 
disposal of the soil by the United States in Congress assembled, nor with any 
regulations Congress may find necessary for securing the title in such soil to the bona 
fide purchasers . . . . 
THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (1787), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 130–31 
(Henry Steele Commager ed., 8th ed. 1968). On the importance of the Northwest Ordinance and 
its implications for current state claims to lands, see Patterson, supra note 73, at 67–72. See also 
UTAH ENABLING ACT, available at http://archives.utah.gov/research/exhibits/Statehood/ 
1894text.htm. (“AN ACT to enable the People of Utah to form a Constitution and State 
Government, and to be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States.”).  
 225. 44 U.S. 212, 224 (1845) (“Whenever the United States shall have fully executed these 
trusts, the municipal sovereignty of the new states will be complete, throughout their respective 
borders, and they, and the original states, will be upon an equal footing, in all respects 
whatever.”). 
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inapposite cases where broad federal powers were stated to exist 
(when litigating compact-based duties of noninterference) from a 
compact-based duty to dispose. That distinction is discussed in the 
previous subsection. Such a duty to dispose is designed, like these 
principles, to limit federal power. Importantly, these Equal Footing 
and Federalism doctrines may not be necessary to find a duty to 
dispose on a compact theory of the Enabling Act, but these 
principles could help tip that theory towards the State’s position if 
there is some reluctance to accept an interpretation finding a 
compact-based duty to dispose. 
Separately and independently, the Equal Footing Doctrine and/or 
basic tenets of Federalism might create independent duties for the 
federal government requiring it to dispose of public land holdings 
wholly apart from (and perhaps in addition to) a compact-based duty 
to dispose arising from the Enabling Act.226 There are strong 
arguments from the original understanding and purpose of the Equal 
Footing227 and Federalism Doctrines228 to support the State of Utah. 
However, the State will need to distinguish the TPLA from the broad 
precedents that seem to reject a narrower reading of the Property 
Clause adopted in Pollard—in much the same way this Article has 
described those cases should be distinguished in relation to the 
compact-based duty to dispose. Moreover, Utah will need to 
overcome the limitations on the breadth of the Equal Footing 
doctrine recognized in some courts.229 
 
 226. Some of the critical articles evaluating these doctrines in relation to Western land 
claims against the federal government include, generally: Albert W. Brodie, A Question of 
Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues Surrounding Federal Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 Pac. 
L.J. 693, 696 (1981); Robert E. Hardwicke et al., The Constitution and the Continental Shelf, 26 
TEX. L. REV. 398 (1948); Natelson, supra note 91; Patterson, supra note 73, at 43 (“[The 
landholding relation] is one of the most basic foundations of our federalism, if, indeed, it is not 
the corner stone.”); Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Private 
Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 254 (1976) (“Every expansion of the property clause increases the 
power of the federal government at the expense of the states’ authority, and by the traditional 
jurisprudence of federalism that is cause for unease.”). 
 227. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 73, at 65 (discussing the Equal Footing Doctrine and its 
relation to Western state claims against federal land retention). 
 228. See, e.g., id. at 43 (“The landholding relation . . . is one of the most basic 
foundations of our federalism, if, indeed, it is not the corner stone.”). 
 229. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166, 171–72 (D. Nev. 1981) (holding 
that the equal footing doctrine does not cover economic equality of states and that different 
impacts on different states were acceptable under the doctrine while reasoning that the broad 
language to the contrary in Pollard was dicta and citing Light to support the idea that it may sell 
or withhold from sale). 
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This Article will not fully analyze the strengths and weakness of 
these additional theories, but the argument in favor of the TPLA 
from Pollard will be briefly introduced here nonetheless. Pollard 
involved a question of whether the United States had the power to 
grant title to certain tidelands in the Mobile Bay in Alabama.230 The 
Court was required to evaluate the effect of Georgia’s cession of the 
Alabama territory to the United States, which was done in the first 
instance to help the United States satisfy Revolutionary War 
debts.231 The Court’s discussion of the issues led to a very limited 
interpretation of the Property Clause—an interpretation that would 
be, as one scholar said, “breathtaking in its scope” if it were to be 
controlling.232 The Court reasoned that the federal government 
acted as a mere proprietor in relation to these lands, that it would 
have a duty to sell its holdings in Alabama if that state was to be on 
an equal footing with other states, and that the Property Clause 
merely “authorized the passage of all laws necessary to secure the 
rights of the United States to the public lands, and to provide for 
their sale, and to protect them from taxation.”233 
The Pollard opinion includes broad language that federal land 
holdings were always meant to be temporary and that the Property 
Clause gives no separate authority for the federal government to 
retain ceded Western lands.234 The Court explained: 
[T]he United States never held any municipal sovereignty, 
jurisdiction, or right of soil in and to the territory of which Alabama 
or any of the new states were formed; except for temporary 
purposes, and to execute the trusts created by the acts of the 
Virginia and Georgia legislatures, and the deeds of cession executed 
by them to the United States, and the trust created by the treaty 
with the French Republic, of the 30th of April, 1803, ceding 
Louisiana.235 
As Rasband describes it, according to Pollard, the Property 
Clause “was not intended to give the United States authority to keep 
and regulate public lands. Instead, the Property Clause was 
 
 230. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 212. 
 231. Id. 
 232. RASBAND ET AL., supra note 15, at 99. 
 233. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 224. 
 234. Id.at 221. 
 235. Id. 
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something like temporary management authority pending the final 
sale and disposition of the public lands that would make Alabama a 
full sovereign.”236 Rasband continues that, “[a]ccording to Pollard, 
the Constitution provided only one way for the United States to 
obtain complete authority over public land and that way was the 
Enclave Clause.”237 
However, many cases after Pollard have taken a broad view of the 
Property Clause that is contrary to Pollard’s language. Rasband 
contends, in part correctly, that courts “were so easily able to 
dismiss Pollard’s narrow view of federal power to retain and regulate 
land within the states [because] it was dicta.”238 Another argument, 
however, would be that Pollard might have some limited applicability 
to another set of cases—those like the TPLA—and that the cases 
dismissing Pollard have been distinguishable from the demand for 
disposal claims in the TPLA. Most courts, even when taking a broad 
view of the Property Clause, have not had to confront the issues of 
federal duties that exist to constrain its own federal powers 
discussed in Pollard; instead, those courts have only had to resolve 
issues of state interference with clear and non-duty-constrained 
federal powers. Any Pollard-based argument will need to distinguish 
those subsequent cases discussed in previous parts that call for a 
near-limitless Property Clause power. 
There may be several ways to accomplish this task of 
differentiation, and this Article leaves the bulk of that research to 
 
 236. RASBAND ET AL., supra note 15, at 98. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 99. Rasband et al. further summarize some of the hurdles of the Pollard-
dependent argument as follows: 
In the end, invocations of Pollard and the equal footing doctrine must be understood 
in context. Sometimes the reference is to the well-established rule that the United 
States will be presumed to have held land under navigable water in trust for the 
future state unless it very plainly indicates a contrary intent. In other cases, talk of 
Pollard and the “equal footing doctrine” refers to its constitutional holding that new 
states must enter the Union on an equal sovereign footing. This is still basic 
constitutional law, although as subsequent courts have clarified, equal footing 
“applies to political rights and sovereignty, not to economic or physical characteristics 
of the states.” United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1319 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997). See also Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) . . . In still 
other cases, invocations of equal footing are an argument from Pollard’s dicta that the 
federal government should not be able to retain and regulate land within the states 
except under the Enclave Clause. It is this argument that forms the legal core of the 
Sagebrush Rebellion and wise use movement . . . .” 
Id. at 101. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014 11:06 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
1186 
future projects. For now, consider just one example. A reasonable 
case for reconciling Pollard and cases like Kleppe can be made based 
on the following methodology adopted in a persuasive student 
comment.239 First, “[t]he inconsistency between Pollard and Kleppe 
may best be resolved by recognizing the equal footing doctrine as a 
continuing limitation on the exercise of the property power, not 
merely as a limit on Congress’s power to impose conditions on the 
admission of states.”240 As such, “Pollard clearly indicates that the 
federal government may not retain land when such retention gives it 
plenary power to displace state autonomy,”241 that is it can exercise 
a power to acquire land or create enclaves it may do so and cannot 
create de facto enclaves by retaining rather than disposing of public 
lands.242 “Accordingly,” the comment continues, “Congress may not 
use the property power to infringe the municipal sovereignty of the 
Western states, because such infringement would be the direct result 
of federal usurpation of a prerogative of the original states: 
ownership of unappropriated lands.”243 Under this reasoning, 
Pollard’s broad language would still be operable even in a post-Kleppe 
world. As this case reconciliation theory concludes, “Congress can, 
of course, purchase land anywhere in the nation for governmental 
purposes and, under Kleppe, exercise broad powers over that 
land.”244 As Natelson has noted, “[t]he Property Clause said nothing 
about retention. It authorized management and disposal.”245 This is 
 
 239. Touton, supra note 52, at 837–38. 
 240. Id. at 837. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. For similar arguments, see also Natelson, supra note 91, at 331 & n.9, 350–51. 
 243. Touton, supra note 52, at 837. Touton continues that such a theory would leave the 
federal government with substantial opportunities to still own and control land if it wishes: 
Congress, through exercise of its powers as landowner, still has substantial power 
over federal land held since statehood. . . . Even as to federal land uses not clearly 
supportable by any enumerated federal power, Congress can seek to acquire exclusive 
federal legislative jurisdiction under the federal enclave clause. The Western states 
have routinely consented to such jurisdiction over national parks and similar areas. It 
seems likely, therefore, that the proposed approach would have no practical effect on 
federal attempts to further legitimate national, governmental goals. 
Id. at 838. 
 244. Id. at 837–38. Touton wonders about what role the courts can play in forcing disposal, 
but concludes at the very least that courts “should not allow Congress to use the property power 
in such a way as to destroy ‘the constitutional equality of the States . . . essential to the 
harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.’” Id. (quoting 
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)). 
 245. Natelson, supra note 91, at 362. Natelson continues that “the Property Clause’s 
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one good starting point for researching these theories and 
developing arguments along these lines. As stated above, any such 
arguments will require further research and testing against the full 
breadth of available case law. 
Alternatively, the State (rather than distinguishing seemingly 
contrary case law from the wisdom of Pollard) may simply need to 
convince the courts to re-embrace the historical findings and dicta 
from Pollard that led to a narrow reading of the Property Clause in 
that case and lead the Pollard Court to describe a broad mandate for 
federal disposal of its land holdings; and, if that is the situation, the 
State will need to convince the court to reject some otherwise 
controlling precedents, if any, that embrace a broader Property 
Clause power.246 
The Federalism and Equal Footing Doctrine arguments and 
similar constitutional claims are also sometimes characterized as 
“constitutional duty to dispose” cases. A contract-based duty to 
dispose must be considered separate and independent of any 
constitutional duty to dispose that some have advanced. For example, 
Natelson summarized that “textual analysis suggests that because all 
powers not granted were reserved and because the Constitution 
conferred no independent power to acquire or retain ‘other Property,’ 
the original meaning of the Constitution was that the federal 
government was required to dispose of any land not ‘necessary’ or 
‘needful’ for enumerated purposes.”247 To the extent there is a 
constitutional duty to dispose—something which is not resolved in 
this Article—it is also important to recognize that any compact 
between the federal government and a new state cannot alter that 
duty even by supposed consent of the state.248 
 
Management Power did not authorize ownership. It merely authorized management of land 
owned for other reasons.” Id. at 363. See also Patterson, supra note 73, at 61 (“A very important 
matter to notice is that when it was considered that the Federal Government would need the 
ownership of the soil for the exercise of its powers . . . specific provision was made in the 
Constitution for its acquisition with the consent of the legislature.”). 
 246. This approach, as well as a full assessment of its strength as a matter of law, would 
require a substantial amount of additional legal investigation and research beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
 247. Natelson, supra note 91, at 365 (“The founding generation’s constitutional values 
support the conclusion that Congress was required to dispose of all ‘other Property’ unneeded 
for enumerated purposes.”); Patterson, supra note 73, at 61–62 (“[T]here was no general grant of 
ownership of the soil that accompanied the grant of the powers of Congress.”). 
 248. See Patterson, supra note 73, at 67 (“A compact of Congress with a state is nothing 
more than a law of Congress. The Constitution cannot be changed by a compact between 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014 11:06 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
1188 
Finally, even if it turns out that there is a strong historical or 
originalist argument favoring a duty arising under the doctrines of 
Equal Footing, Federalism, or other constitutional claims, litigation 
success on such theories will undoubtedly be difficult. Given the 
relative breadth of the rhetoric (or perhaps precedent) on the broad 
Property Clause power theories—viewed together with a general 
increasing deference toward federal control and plenary federal 
power in our constitutional system—it may be difficult to predict a 
State victory on these power-curtailment theories in the courts. That 
reality again makes a compact-based duty to dispose a seemingly 
stronger argument for those seeking to uphold the TPLA. 
D. A Few Thoughts on Justiciability Concerns 
Aside from the arguments on the merits, should the Federal 
government fail to comply with Utah’s demand in the TPLA, and 
should the State of Utah wish to sue on the theories that support 
that demand, the State will need to evaluate potential justiciability 
hurdles that might preclude enforcement in the courts.249 Further 
analysis of this issue would be necessary should such a lawsuit come 
to pass. 
 
Congress and a state or all of the states.”). While there are certainly some very interesting, 
alternative courses of argument (such as this constitutional one, which separately identifies 
reasons Congress may be obligated to dispose of federal public lands), evaluating these 
arguments is a task best taken separate from this Article’s focus. 
 249. For example, the Light Court discusses enforcement of federal government trusts 
primarily through political accountability not the courts: 
“All the public lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the whole 
country.” United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co. 137 U. S. 160, 34 L. ed. 640, 
11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57. And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be 
administered. That is for Congress to determine. The courts cannot compel it to set 
aside the lands for settlement, or to suffer them to be used for agricultural or grazing 
purposes, nor interfere when, in the exercise of its discretion, Congress establishes a 
forest reserve for what it decides to be national and public purposes. In the same way 
and in the exercise of the same trust it may disestablish a reserve, and devote the 
property to some other national and public purpose. These are rights incident to 
proprietorship, to say nothing of the power of the United States as a sovereign over 
the property belonging to it. 
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 536 
(1976) (“[W]e must remain mindful that, while courts must eventually pass upon them, 
determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of 
Congress.”). Nevertheless, the courts have adjudicated disputes involving alleged state violations 
of compact terms, and Kleppe does recognize that “courts must eventually pass upon” Property 
Clause disputes. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 536. Without further research and analysis, this Article takes 
no position on how the courts might or should deal with these justiciability issues. 
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However, even if the TPLA’s enforceability were determined 
non-justiciable, the inability to use the federal courts to enforce a 
duty does not eviscerate the existence of the duty itself. The federal 
government would still have an independent obligation to live up to 
its commitments, but it would require political will on the part of 
legislators and pressure applied and accountability demanded by the 
electorate. Congress could still demonstrate that it is a reliable 
contractual participant in its deal making. Congress has a 
responsibility to respect the states and many questions of federalism 
require congressional commitment and self-adherence to its 
promises and respect for the limits in the Constitution’s institutional 
structure. There are many obligations in our constitutional scheme 
that require political actors to abide by their oath and constitutional 
duties, irrespective of whether a court order can compel the action. 
As it is within Congress’s power to dispose,250 it could choose to do 
so and honor its promise and relieve itself of the indebtedness it 
owes to the states. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Utah’s Transfer of Public Lands Act presents fascinating issues 
for the areas of public lands, natural resources, and constitutional 
law. There are credible legal arguments supporting Utah’s demand 
that the federal government extinguish certain public lands within 
the State. At the very least, it seems clear that the law is not 
“clearly” unconstitutional as some opponents contend. 
This Article has provided an overview of the legal arguments on 
both sides of the TPLA debate. As Utah continues along its TPLA 
path and as other states explore similar measures, each state’s 
legislation should be analyzed in light of its own individual enabling 
act commitments and relevant constitutional provisions. Given many 
similarities in those documents across Western states, this Article 
should prove of some utility for the analysis of each state’s transfer 
legislation as it emerges. In the end, there is a credible case that 
rules of construction favor an interpretation of the Utah Enabling 
Act that includes some form of a duty to dispose on the part of the 
federal government. Other theories may also support the TPLA 
demand. At a minimum, the legal arguments in favor of the TPLA 
 
 250. See supra notes 112 through 130 and accompanying text. 
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are serious and, if taken seriously, the TPLA presents an opportunity 
for further clarification of public lands law and the relationship 
between the states and the federal government regarding those 
lands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
